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Directed by Joseph E. Bryson. 165 pp. 
The purpose of this historical study was to examine 
the legal aspects of court-ordered busing for the purpose 
of desegrating de facto segregated public school systems. 
The study sought answers to the following questions: What 
has been the trend regarding court-ordered busing in de 
facto segregated school districts? How has the United 
States Supreme Court ruled in cases involving de facto 
school segregation? What is meant by the term "intent' 
to segregate"? What has the United States Supreme Court 
required in busing across school district boundaries in 
order to correct an inequity in segregated school systems? 
To what extent has the United States Supreme Court mandated 
remedial plans to desegregate de facto segregated school s 
systems? 
The investigative process used consisted of an analysis 
of the judicial decisions rendered in nine significant 
United States Supreme Court cases concerned with desegrega­
ting de facto segregated school districts. Each case 
was reviewed in light of its facts, its. decisions, and 
the legal precedents it established. 
The study provided the following findings in response 
to the five research questions: 
1. The Court upheld busing in cases involving 
segregative intent and racial classification when 
stated in school policies. 
2. No busing was required in cases which had no his­
tory of segregative intent due to segregative housing 
patterns of migratory demographics. 
3. When segregative intent was found on the part of 
school or state officials, the concept of de 
jure segregation was extended. 
4. A multi-district remedy could not be instituted 
on a single school district unless the other 
districts through discriminatory acts had caused 
interdistrict segregation. 
5. Remedial plans to desegregate school districts 
were mandated whenever there was evidence of 
segregation and intent to segregate by school 
authorities. 
This study further established that judicial relief 
may be obtained in certain de facto school desegregation 
cases, but unanimous decisions in such cases is rare. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The unclear aspects of de facto school segregation 
and the complexity of its migratory facets have aided its 
legal existence in many non-Southern school systems. While 
surface intent to racially segregate the schools by the 
governing bodies may be absent and legal de jure segregation 
no longer exists, racial segregation of students remains 
a stark reality in de facto segregated school districts. 
The 1954 Brown v. Topeka Board of Education Supreme 
Court decision declared an end to legal public school seg­
regation in the United States.1 The ensuing years yielded, 
an array of court-litigated public school decisions that 
severed the remaining vestiges of de jure public school 
segregation. These decisions, which often involved extensive 
busing, were aimed primarily at school districts in the 
South. 
The federal courts ordered desegregation of most seg­
regated minority schools and recommended that schools adopt 
plans approximately reflecting the racial ratio of the 
district.2 Busing was used extensively in the implementation 
^Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, 34 U.S. 
483, 98, LEd 873 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954). 
2Gary Orfield, Must We Bus? (Washington D.C.: The 
Brooking Institution, 1978), p. 135. 
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of the Swann v. Mecklenburg Board of Education decision 
as well as in many other public school desegregation efforts 
in the Southern states. Although busing had been used 
to desegregate de jure segregated school districts, the 
legal aspects of busing for the desegregation of the de 
facto segregated school districts were more complex. 
Statement of the Problem 
The court litigation efforts to desegregate de facto 
segregated school districts became a paramount issue in 
the 1970's. Nearly thirty years after the Brown decision, 
many non-Southern school districts still consisted of some 
racially segregated schools. The legal aspects of busing 
for the desegregation of these school districts bear inves­
tigation. It is possible that trends from court decisions 
can indicate guidelines for eliminating all public school 
segregation. Presently, school administrators and school 
board members lack clear-cut guidelines and data relative 
to the legal aspects for the eradication of de facto segrega­
tion in the public schools. Thus, a need does exist for 
an examination and compilation of the legal aspects of 
busing for desegregation in the nation's de facto segregated 
public school. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to present the legal 
basis for court-ordered busing to desegregate the d£ facto 
3 
segregated public schools. This study examined pertinent 
court decisions which have dealt with busing_ in de facto 
segregated school districts. The following questions were 
of primary concern in achieving the purpose of this study: 
1. What has been the trend in court-ordered busing 
in d£ facto segregated school districts? 
2. How has the United States Supreme Court ruled in 
cases involving de facto segregation? 
3. What does the United States Supreme Court mean by 
"intent to segregate"? 
4. What has the United States Supreme Court required 
in busing across school district boundaries in 
order to correct an inequity in segregated school 
systems? 
5. To what extent has the United States Supreme Court 
mandated remedial plans to desegregate de facto 
school systems? 
This study analyzed significant judicial decisions which 
related to busing in de^ facto segregated school cases. A 
review of the Congressional mandates concerning school busing 
was also presented. Finally, this study has provided insights 
into an often neglected chapter of public school desegregation. 
Scope of the Study 
This is a historical study limited to the questions 
which focus upon the legal aspects of busing for desegregation 
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in de facto segregated school districts. In order to specify 
certain parameters to this historical study, five pivotal 
questions were addressed. 
The judicial investigations selected for this study 
begin with the United States Supreme Court Brown I decision 
in 1954 and terminate with the United States Supreme Court 
Crawford desegregation decision of 1982. These landmark 
litigations served as the primary source for this writer's 
research. A summary of recent legislative pursuits is 
presented and analyzed as related essentials for this research. 
Because of the numerous social facets of segregation, this 
study did not attempt to delve into areas beyond the legal 
aspects of busing for desegregation in de facto segregated 
school districts. Intensive research into other aspects 
of school desegregation was beyond the realistic limits 
of this study. 
Methods, Procedures and Sources 
The basic research procedure of this historical study 
was to review and analyze nine selected court cases regarding 
the legal aspects of busing in de facto segregated school 
districts. To determine whether a need existed for this 
research, an examination was made of the Dissertation Ab­
stracts for topics focusing on busing as a means for school 
desegregation. The search revealed that very few studies 
have investigated this topic. Research summaries from 
the legislative actions of the 97th Congress were found 
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in issue briefs published by the Library of Congress Con­
gressional Research Service. A partial review of the related 
literature was obtained through a computer search from 
the Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC). 
Journal articles on school desegregation were researched 
through the use of the Reader's Guide to Periodical Litera­
ture and The Education Index in order to acquire relevant 
information, viewpoints, and in-depth treatment of the 
subject. 
Landmark court cases relating to the topic were re­
searched using the U.S. Supreme Court Digest, the U.S. 
Supreme Court Reports, the U.S. Report Lawyer's Edition, 
the Federal Supplement, the West Education Law Report, 
and the Corpus Juris Secundum. Additional information 
was examined in selected related topics as cited in the 
bibliography. 
Definition of Terms 
The following definitions were pertinent to this study: 
Action; Court proceeding; a suit 
Appellant: A court or agency that has review power 
Concurring Opinion; The opinion of one of several judges 
which is in agreement with the majority yet for reasons 
other than those of the majority 
Congressional Mandates: Orders authorized by the enactment 
of laws by the United States Congress 
Constitutional Rule : A law deriving from the constitution 
or authoritative document of a nation or body of people 
De Facto: Existing in actual fact, regardless of legal 
establishment of recognition; distinguished from de 
jure 
Defendant; In a court action, one who defends the propriety 
of his acts and against whom relief is brought 
De Jure: Within the law; according to legal establishment 
as distinguished from actual fact 
Enjoin: To order or prohibit action 
Injuction: Judicial order that restrains a person or agency 
from a certain course of action 
Litigation: The legal proceedings by which a lawsuit is 
settled 
Plainiff: One who files a lawsuit 
Remand: The returning of a court case from a superior 
court to a lower court. 
Vacate: To make void or to annul a lower court's decision 
by action of a superior court 
Writ of. certiorari: A court order that a higher court 
issues to a lower court requesting that court records 
be sent to the higher court for review 
Design of the Study 
The remainder of the study is divided into four major 
parts. Chapter II contains a review of related literature, 
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focusing on the history of desegregation efforts in the 
public schools and showing the relationship between busing 
and the major issue of school desegregation. This chapter 
not only provides a profile of the eleven justices of the 
Supreme Court since 1973, but summarizes recent legislative 
action on busing for desegregation. 
Chapter III describes the legal aspect of the de 
facto desegregation process. It begins with the segrega­
tive intent issue in Keyes and ends with the most recent 
United States Supreme Court ruling in the Crawford decision. 
Furthermore, this chapter contains an analysis of significant 
United States Supreme Court cases involving busing for 
desegregation in traditionally de facto segregated school 
districts. 
Chapter IV provides a description of the selected 
nine landmark cases used in this study, presenting the 
facts, the decisions, and discussion of each case. 
Chapter V summarizes the study and delineates the 
conclusions from the analysis of the selected United States 
Supreme Court Cases. The legal requirements derived from 
the landmark decisions are also designated. Based on the 
five selected questions underlying the study, the answers 
are presented with responses derived in the selected cases. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Overview 
The awesome trust for an integrated education for 
black Americans did not originate in 1954. The development 
of that year was a milestone on a much longer, older and 
larger social movement for human equality. Indeed, the 
1896 Plessy v. Ferguson decision,1 a transportation case, 
had mandated a "separate but equal" doctrine which loomed 
as a dark cloud for black Americans for sixty years. 
But on the morning of May 17, 1954, the United States 
Supreme Court etched a momentous decision in the pages 
of history known as the Brown decision. That pivotal decision 
annulled laws in seventeen states that had required or 
permitted racially segregated schools. Chief Justice Earl 
Warren stated: 
We conclude that in the field of public education 
the doctrine of 'separate-but-equal' has no place. 
Separate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal.2 
1-Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 
41 L. Ed. 256. 
^H. C. Hudgins, Jr., The Warren Court and Its Public 
Schools (Danville, Illinois: The Interstate Printers and 
Publishers, Inc. 1970), p. 76. 
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The Brown decision became the forerunner of unprece­
dented de jure segregated school litigations which were 
to take place in the following decade. For a while, the 
South responded with considerable resistance. However, 
in time, public school integration became more accepted 
and more complete in the South than in any other section 
of the country. In more recent years, the court litigations 
have been aimed at de facto segregation and at busing to 
achieve integration in de facto segregated school districts. 
Legal Racial Discrimination 
and the Brpwn Decsision 
On September 22, 1862, President Abraham Lincoln an­
nounced that on the first of the following January, "all 
persons held as slaves within any state or designated part 
of a state . . . shall be then, thence forward and forever 
free", and that on that day he would, by proclamation, 
"designate that the states and parts thereof" which continued 
to hold slaves should be in "rebellion against the United 
States".3 President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proc­
lamation January 1, 1863.4 
In December 1863, the United States House of Repre­
sentatives received a resolution for a Thirteenth Amendment 
3The Lincoln Library, 31st ed. (Buffalo, New York: 
The Frontier Press Co., 1968), p. 400. 
^Emancipation Proclamation, 12 Stat. 1268 (1863). 
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to the Constitution prohibiting slavery within the United 
States or any place subject to its jurisdiction. By Jan­
uary 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment had been ratified and 
the abolition of slavery became law.5 
Three years after the abolishment of slavery in 1865, 
the Congress of the United States adopted the Fourteenth 
Amendment which provided blacks with citizenship and guar­
anteed them equal protection of the laws.® However, in 
spite of these constitutional amendments, by the 1880's, 
many state laws had been passed which were designed to 
segregate the black race.7 "Jim Crow" was to become a 
code term for all these laws and their impact. Although 
the origin of the term "Jim Crow" was uncertain, the connota­
tion was clear.8 c. Vann Woodward in speaking of Jim Crow 
practices stated: 
That code lent the sanction of law to a racial 
ostracism that extended to churches and schools, 
to housing and jobs, to eating and drinking. 
Whether by law or by custom, that ostracism 
eventually extended to virtually all forms of 
public transportation, to sports and recreation, 
5u.S., Constitution, amend. XIII, sec. 1. 
^U.S., Constitution, amend. XIV, sec. 1. 
7C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 7". 
8Alan Barth, Prophets with Honor, (New York: Random 
House, 1974), p. 26. 
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to hospitals, orphanages, and prisons and asylums, 
and ultimately to funeral homes, morgues, and 
cemeteries.9 
From 1865 until 1970 the school segregation laws were 
challenged thirty-seven times.10 In each case, however, 
the courts upheld separate schools. Only nine of these 
cases proved somewhat successful.H In most instances, 
the court found that inequality had not been proven.12 
Only two cases were heard by the Supreme Court during some 
fifty years of de jure segregation.13 Although neither 
the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, 1871, or 1875, nor 
the Fourteenth Amendment, nor the United States Constitu­
tion at any place mentioned education, each was concerned 
with the rights of all citizens and yet seemed to have 
provided the opportunity for a dual school system of ed­
ucation for Negroes and whites to be established throughout 
the South.1^ 
^Woodward, p. 7. 
l^Richard Bardolph, The Civil Rights Record (New York: 
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1970), p. 216. 
Hlbid. 
12ibid. 
l^Hudgins, p. 75. 
l4Robert M. Stockard, The United States Supreme Court 
and The Legal Aspects of Busing for Public School Deseqreqa-
tion (EdD dissertation, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 
1978), p. 12. 
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In the Plessy case, Chief Justice Melville Weston 
Fuller choose Justice Henry Billings Brown to write the 
Supreme Court's opinion, with only one Justice dissenting 
from the Court majority.^5 
In the Court's opinion, Justice Brown wrote the following 
about the Fourteenth Amendment: 
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to 
enforce the absolute equality of the two before 
the law, but in the nature of things it could 
not have been intended to abolish distinctions 
based upon color, or to enforce social, as dis­
tinguished from political equality, or a comming­
ling of the two races upon terms .unsatisfactory 
to either. 
Justice Brown stated further that: 
The distinction betwen laws interfering with 
the political equality of the Negro and those 
requiring the separation of the two races in 
schools, theatres and railway carriages has been 
frequently drawn by this court.^ 
The legal end to de jure school segregation climaxed 
with the Supreme Court decision in the now famous case 
known as Brown v. Board of Education, which clearly denied 
the "separate but equal" doctrine.18 
l5Richard Kluger, Simple Justice (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1975), p. 73. 
!6lbid., p. 74 
l^Hudgins, p. 74. 
l^Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483. 
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In Briggs v. Elliott/ a companion South Carolina deseg­
regation case to Brovn and argued on the same day that 
Brown was argued, a counselor for the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People, Attorney Thurgood 
Marshall, stated to the court,^ "Now is the time we submit 
that this Court should make it clear that this is not what 
our Constitution stands - for."20 Marshall's main thesis 
was that racial segregation imposed by law is a violation 
of the United States Constitution. 
As far back as 1823, 
The court struck down a South Carolina law order 
that detained free Negro sailors who came to 
Charleston in jail so long as their ship was 
in port—a practice countenanced in the name 
of public safety and necessity.21 
Among other examples, Mr. Marshall cited Justice Oliver 
Holmes' 1927 opinion in Nixon v. Herdon, the first of the 
Texas white primary cases, which noted: 
State may do a good deal of classifying that 
is difficult to believe rational, but there are 
limits and it is too clear for extended argument 
classification affecting the right set up in 
this case.22 
l^Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F. Supp. 920 (1952). 
20Langston Hughes, Fight for Freedom: The Story of 
the NAACP (New York: W. W. Horton & Company, Inc. 1962), 
p. 139. 
21guoted in Kluger, p. 570. 
22ibid. 
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The Court, Marshall declared: 
. . . has repeatedly said that these distinctions 
on a racial basis or on a basis of ancestry are 
odious and invidious, and those decisions, I 
think, are entitled to just as much weight as 
Plessy v. Ferguson or Gong Lum v. Rica.23 
Former Solicitor General and accomplished appellate 
lawyer John W. Davis had three points to make about the 
case: 
First, South Carolina had compiled with the mandate 
of the court below and equalized its schools 
or was well on the way to doing so. 
Second, the right of a state to classify its 
public school pupils by race was 'not impaired 
or affected' by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Third, the social-science testimony offered by 
the plaintiffs, 'be its merit what it may, deals 
entirely with legislative policy and does not 
tread on constitutional rights. Whether it does 
or not, it would be difficult for me to conceal 
my opinion that the evidence in and of itself 
is of slight weight and in conflict with the 
opinion of other and better informed sources.'24 
Robert Carter, Marshall's key assistant on the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People's Legal 
Defense Fund Staff, had argued earlier in the day in the 
name of Oliver Brown: 
'It is the gravamen of our complaint.' He asserted 
that the appellants were being deprived of the 
equal protection of the law, 'because the act 
of segregation in and of itself denies them equal 
educational opportunities which the Fourteenth 
Amendment secures.' 
23Ibid. 
24Ibid. 
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He added, 'Here we abandon any claim ... of 
any constitutional inequality which comes from 
anything other than the act of segregation itself.' 
The act, he said, in summarizing the testimonies 
in the trial court, 'tended to relegate appellants 
and their group to an inferior casts . . . lowered 
their level of aspiration . . . instilled feelings 
of insecurity . . . retarded their mental and 
educational development.' Carter concluded, 'It 
is our position that any legislative or governmental 
classification must fall with an even hand on 
all persons similarly situated.25 
Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the opinion for the 
Court: 
We come then to the question presented: Does 
segregation of children in public schools solely 
on the basis of race, even though the physical 
facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be 
equal, deprive the children of the minority group 
of equal educational opportunities? We believe 
that it does . . . 
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological 
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson. 
This finding is amply supported by modern authority. 
Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to 
this finding is rejected.^ 
Chief Justice Earl Warren then concluded in his written 
opinion: 
We conclude that in the field of public education 
the doctrine of 'separate but equal*- has no place. 
Separate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal.2' 
25Ibid., 570» 
^^Barth, p. 51. 
27ifc>id. 
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On May 18, 1954, the New York Times published an unpre­
cedented eight pages of news and comments concerning the 
pronouncement, including the complete text of the Supreme 
decision.28 
But a page of condensed opinions from all over the 
country quoted Alabama's Birmingham News as stating editori­
ally: "The News believes that the considerations of public 
interest and states' rights which underlay the superceded 
decision of 1896 still apply and would better serve progress 
in racial relations and education."29 Senator James 0. 
Eastland of Mississippi was reported as saying flatly that 
the. South "will not abide by nor obey this legislative 
decision by a political court."30 
Just before the school bells began to ring in September 
1954, the New York Times carried a report from Georgia's 
Governor Herman Talmadge which stated: "No force whatever 
could compel admission of Negroes and whites to the same 
school." Earlier he had called the Supreme Court decision 
a "step toward national suicide."31 
The governor of Georgia, Herman Talmadge,-and the 
Governor of South Carolina, James F. Brynes, threatened 
28Hughes, p. 140. 
29ibid. 
30lbid. 
31lbid., 141 
to close the public schools rather than give up segregation 
Following Thurgood Marshall's request that the Supreme 
Court order school segregation to begin "not later than 
September 1956", the Court on May 31, 1955, in Brown II, 
ordered that educational integration be achieved "with 
all delibrate speed" compatible with "practical flexibil­
ity. "33 
In this Brown II case,34 the Supreme Court opinion 
stated: 
During this period of transition, the courts will 
retain jurisdiction of these cases.35 
An article in the U.S. News & World Report described 
the early school integration years: 
The experience of Washington, the first major 
city to turn from segregated to integrated schools, 
may have meaning for other cities. For 20 years, 
the percentage of Negroes has been increasing 
steadily in Washington's population, growing 
even faster in the District's public schools. 
Already Negro pupils outnumber whites. Since 
school segregation was ordered ended in Washington 
last summer, this trend has picked up speed.3° 
32Marion A. Wright and Arnold Shankman, Human Rights 
Odyssey (Durham, North Carolina: Moore Publishing Company 
1978). 
33nughes, p. 143. 
34srown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 
294 (1955). 
35nudgins, p. 84. 
36"As Mixed Schools Come to the U.S. Capital," U. 
S. News and World Report, 12 November 1954, p. 52. 
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The third United States Supreme Court decision in 
support of Brown was handed down on October 10, 1955. 
It held that the constitutional rights of children must 
not be discriminated against in school admission on the 
grounds of race or color.37 jt may be unnecessary to 
add that this decision, like the "deliberate speed" decision, 
has not yet been fully implemented either.38 
The landmark decision got its first out-of-court support 
from blacks and college youth through the civil rights 
movement. Support came alive in ma.ny forms: from Martin 
Luther King, Jr. at Montgomery; from the Freedom Riders, 
the student "sit-ins" and "other-ins", and the Student 
Non-violent Coordinating Committee; from voter registration 
campaigns, as in Birmingham, the Selma March, and from 
the March on Washington of 1963.39 
The inevitability of involuntary busing could prob­
ably have been inferred in the Alexander v. Holmes case 
in Mississippi where the United States Supreme Court insisted 
that there was an obligation for every school district 
to terminate dual school systems at once and to operate 
37;Leon Jones, From Brown to Boston, 2 Vols. (Metuchen, 
N. J.: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1979), 1:11. 
38ifc>id. 
39lbid. 
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now and hereafter only unitary schools. 
That same year, 1969, the Powell v. Board of Education 
of Oklahoma City decision maintained that the burden was 
on the school board to desegregate an unconstitutional 
dual system at once.^l 
Busing was to be an explicit tool for integration 
in the Swann case.^2 
The Swann Decision and Busing 
The transportation of children to and from school 
originated in Massachusetts in 1869, when a law was passed 
which authorized the spending of public funds for school 
transportation.4 3 (See Table 1) 
The vehicles employed in this task were, for the most part, 
horse-drawn wagons or carriages, providers and drivers 
of which were paid in proportion to the number of students 
^Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education 90 
S. Ct. 437 396 U.S. 976, 24 L. Ed. 449 (1969). 
4lDowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public 
Schools, 90 S. ct. 415, 396 U.S. 269, 24 L. Ed. 2d 414 
(1969). 
42James E. Swann et al. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board 
of Education, 403 U.S. 912 29 L. Ed. 2d 689, 91 S. ct. 
220, 2201 (1970). 
^ Nicolous Mills, 'busing: Who's Being Taken for 
a Ride?" In The Great School Bus Controversy, (New York: 
Columbia University, 1973), p. 4. 
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they hauled.44 In 1927-1928, 12 percent of the school 
transportation vehicles used in 32 states were still horse-
powered rather than motor powered.4^ 
Nicholous Mills cited two myths surrounding busing: 
(1) busing is the exception and the neighborhood school 
is always the most desirable, and (2) riding on the bus 
is bad for children.4® But the prevailing question was, 
"At what point is there excessive busing to achieve racial 
balance in the school desegregation issue?" Many persons 
argued that this point occurred in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
school district. 
It is an accepted contention that the federal district 
court's management of school desegregation in the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg schools required extensive busing. 
The following arrangement occurred in the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg School District: 
The schools in the heavily black inner city 
exchanged pupils with twenty-four mostly white 
schools in the fringes of the city or in the 
suburbs of surrounding Mecklenburg County. 
The bus routes, between schools averaged 15 
miles in length and it was estimated that it 
required an average travel time of about 1 hour 
10 minutes each way.4^ 
44Ibid. 
45ibid. 
46Ibid. 
4^U.S. News & World Report, 16 March 1970, p. 31. 
21 
TABLE 1 
Year of Statutory Authorization for Public Pupil 
Transportation by State: 1869 - 1918 
Date State Date State 
1869 Massachusetts 1903 Virginia 
1876 Vermont 1904 Maryland 
1880 Maine 1905 Oklahoma 
1885 New Hampshire 1905 Utah 
1889 Florida 1967 Missouri 
1893 Connecticut 1908 West Virginia 
1894 Ohio 1909 Colorado 
1895 New Jersey 1910 Mississippi 
1896 New York 1911 Arkansas 
1897 Iowa 1911 Georgia 
1897 Nebraska 1911 Illinois 
1897 Pennsylvania 1911 North Carolina 
1898 Rhode Island 1912 South Carolina 
1899 North Dakota 1913 Idaho 
1899 South Dakota 1913 Tennessee 
1899 Indiana 1915 Nevada 
1901 California 1915 Alabama 
1901 Minnesota 1915 Texas 
1901 Washington 1916 Louisiana 
1903 Michigan 1917 New Mexico 
1903 ;Montana 1918 Delaware 
1903 Oregon 1919 Wyoming 
Source: Nicolous Mills, "Who' 
The Great School Controversity 
s Being Taken 
ed. Nicholous 
for a Ride?" 
Mills (New 
York: Columbia University, 1973), p. 6. 
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Judge James McMillan said: "Cost is not a valid 
legal reason for continued denial of constitutional rights."48 
But a close examination revealed that the Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg school system, forty-third largest in the nation 
served 84,000 pupils, 71 percent white and 29 percent 
black. Two thirds of the black students attended just 
21 schools which were either totally or more than 99 percent 
Negro as of June 1969^9 
The school board, after vigorous prodding, presented 
only a partially completed plan.50 in light of the board's 
failure to comply with the court's mandate, Judge McMillan 
appointed Dr. John Finger, an expert in educational admin­
istration, to prepare a desegregation plan for the court.51 
The "Finger Plan", as finally presented, was extremely 
controversial in its method of dealing with the desegre­
gation of the junior and senior high schools, and it aroused 
heated local debate.52 
48ibid. 
49prank T. Read, "Judicial Evolution of the Law of 
School Integration Since Brown v. Board of Education", 
in The Courts, Social Science, and School Desegregation, 
ed. Betsy Levin and W. C. Hawley (New Brunswick, New Jersey: 
Transaction Books, 1975), p. 34. 
50lbid. 
51lbid. 
52jbid. 
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The board plan proposed substantial assignment of 
Negroes to nine of the system's ten high schools, producing 
17 percent to 36 percent Negro population in each.53 
The projected Negro attendance at the tenth school, Indepen­
dence, was 2 percent. The proposed attendance zones for 
the high school were typically shaped like wedges of a 
pie extending outward from the center of the city to 
the suburban and rural areas of the county in order to 
afford residents of the center city area access to outlying 
schools.54 
Furthermore, the board plan rezoned the twenty-one 
junior high areas so that in twenty the Negro attendance 
would range from none to 38 percent. The other school, 
located in the heart of the Negro residential area, was 
left with an enrollment of 90 percent Negro.55 
The board plan with respect to elementary schools 
relied entirely on gerrymandering of geographic zones. 
More than half of the Negro elementary pupils were left 
in nine schools that were 86 percent to 100 percent Negro; 
approximately half of the white elementary pupils were 
assigned to schools 86 percent to 100 percent white.56 
53Nicolous Mills, The Great School Bus Controversy, 
p. 49. 
54ibid. 
55ifc>id. 
56ibid. 
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The Finger Plan departed from the board plan chiefly 
in its handling of the system's 76 elementary schools. 
Rather than relying solely upon geographic zoning, Dr. 
Finger proposed the use of zoning, pairing, and grouping 
techniques, with the result that student bodies throughout 
the system would range from 9 percent to 38 percent Negro.57 
Justice McMillan described the district court's plan 
as follows: 
Like the board plan, the Finger Plan does as much 
by rezoning school attendance lines as can reasonably 
be accomplished. However, unlike the board plan, 
it does not stop there. It goes further and desgregates 
all the rest of the elementary schools by the tech­
nique of grouping two or three outlying schools with 
one black inner city school; by transporting black 
students from grades one through four to the outlying 
white schools; and by transporting white students 
from the fifth and sixth grades from the outlying 
white schools to the inner city black schools. 
Eleven years later, Justice McMillan explained the 
Court's position in the following manner: 
A bus is like a building or a teacher, or a 
curriculum. The location of buildings is permanent. 
The buildings were located that way for segregation. 
As long as they continue to be used for education, 
the teachers and children will have to be transported. 
A lot of them don't have cars.59 
511bid. 
58ibid. 
59gUoted in Dudley Clendenin, "School Bus Blocked?", 
Greensboro News and Record, Greensboro, N. C., 6 June 
1982, sec. C, p. 1. 
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Dr. Jay M. Robinson, who became superintendent of 
the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system in 1977, acknowledged 
a similar position: "... well, when all the blacks 
live here, and all the whites live over here, how the 
hell can you be for integration but against busing? You 
got to be for trucking, or training, or something to get 
them from here to here."60 
The District Court ordered, among other things, (1) 
that faculty members be reassigned in such a manner as 
to result in the ratio of Negro and white faculty members 
in each school being approximately the same as the ratio 
of Negro and white faculty members throughout the school 
system; (2) that in accordance with the school board's 
plan, as modified by the Finger's plan, new attendance 
zones be created for secondary schools, and some inner-city 
Negroes be transported to outlying, predominantly white 
schools, so that the percentage of Negroes would range 
from about 17 percent to less than 36 percent in each 
high school and would range from about 9 percent to about 
33 percent in each junior high school; and (3) that in 
accordance with the Finger plan, new attendance zones 
and pairings and grouping of schools be used for elementary 
schools, and the amount of busing of elementary school 
students be substantially increased so that the percentage 
60Ibid. 
of Negroes in each elementary school would range from 
about 9 percent to about 38 percent.61 
Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Warren Burger's 
opinion confounded court watchers and the Nixon adminis­
tration alike, for it specifically upheld not only busing 
but also racial quotas, pairing or grouping of schools, 
and gerrymandering of attendance zones as well as other 
devices designed to remove "all vestiges of state-imposed 
segregation . . . Desegregation plans cannot be limited 
to the walk-in school."62 
Meanwhile, the United States Congress became involved 
when a proposed constitutional amendment on busing by 
Long Island Republican Congressman Norman Lent stated: 
"No public school student shall, because of his race, 
creed or color, be assigned to or required to attend a 
particular school."63 
The language of the proposal brought the following 
editorial response from the New Republic magazine: 
61James E. Swann, et al. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education et al. 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). 
62nenry J. Abraham, "Civil Rights and Liberties in 
the United States", in Freedom and the Court (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 380. 
63william F. Buckley, "Busing Amendment", The New 
Republic (Editorial) 26 February 1972, p. 5. 
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The subject is not a suitable one for inclusion 
in the Constitution. The Constitution is not 
the Internal Revenue Code or the Primary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1972. It is the 
place, as all conservatives should appreciate, 
for fundamental, substantive procedural and 
structural provisions, suited, as John Marshall 
said, for ages to come, nothing more preposte­
rously out of place has been proposed for treatment 
in the Constitution since prohibition and its 
repeal. No reasonable person would want to 
convert the Constitution into a code of detail 
regulations, dealing with the grievances of 
each passing day, after the fashion of so many 
state constitutions, which are amended semi­
annually and replaced in toto every other decade.64 
The Court in Swann referred to desegregation as 
"States having a long history of maintaining two sets 
of schools . . . operated to carry out a governmental 
policy to separate pupils solely on the basis of race."65 
President Richard Nixon is recorded as having said 
in 1971: 
I would also like to restate my position as 
it relates to busing. I am against busing, 
as that term is commonly used in school desegrega­
tion cases. I have consistently opposed the 
busing of our nation's school children to achieve 
a racial balance, and I am opposed to busing 
of children simply for the sake of busing.6° 
®^Ibid. 
65James Bolner and Robert Shanley, Busing: The Political 
and Judicial Process (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), 
p. 16. 
66Mills, p. 3. 
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But in 1971, Chief Justice Warren Burger submitted 
an opinion of a different viewpoint: 
All things being equal, with no history of discrimina­
tion, it might well be desirable to assign pupils 
to schools nearest their homes. But all things are 
not equal in a system that has been deliberately 
constructed and maintained to enforce racial segrega­
tion.67 
Moreover, while de jure segregation was being completely 
dismantled by the United States Supreme Court and the 
lower courts, busing itself was becomjing the object of 
public and legal criticisms. In Swann, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld the implementation of forced busing 
to desegregate and racially balance the schools in the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system. However, in Swann, 
the question of reasonableness seemed not to have forged 
with the desired results of school integration by the 
courts. 
In the de facto segregated school cases which were 
soon to come before the courts, busing as a legitimate 
tool for the implementation of school integration was 
to be viewed and scrutinized in a far more resistive vein 
by several members of the United States Supreme Court 
and by various members of Congress. 
68Joseph E. Bryson, "'Salting the Bird's Tail1 and 
The Question of 'Reasonableness1 in Public School Desegregation," 
unpublished paper, University of North Carolina at Greensboro. 
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The Politics of Justice and Presidential 
Influence in the Supreme Court decisions 
The justices under Chief Justice Earl Warren made 
the Supreme Court appear less conservative than today's 
Court under Chief Justice Warren Earl Burger. Furthermore, 
the highest Court in the land underwent six changes between 
1969 and 1982. These changes on the Supreme Court were 
not only positional, but they also involved a shift to 
a more conservative conscience in the rendering of judicial 
decisions concerning involuntary busing for school integration. 
The Court's ambiguous ideological viewpoint can be 
analyzed by examining the court's decisions in non-Southern 
school desegregation cases which can be contrasted with 
earlier Southern school desegregation cases. The perceived 
independence and the so-called absolute beliefs of the 
individual justices are unable to be measured, for these 
personal traits must be balanced in conjunction with the 
political nomination to the Court by the United States 
President and the confirmation of the Court by the United 
States Senate. 
Phillipa Strum sought to clarify the true disposition 
of all courts in America with the following poignant 
observation: 
The interpretative power of the court serves 
as a methodology by which a supposedly neutral 
third force can arbitrate between the government 
and its citizens when a difference of purpose 
or of understanding arises between them. Although 
30 
most American children are taught in the fifth 
grade and again in high school that the "founding 
fathers" thoughtfully provided them with a government 
composed of three branches, American adults 
seem to visualize their government as a two-pronged 
entity, with a disinterested and unconnected 
judiciary somehow established on the sidelines. 
'Polities' to these Americans means 'elections', 
and since there is no apparent relation between 
the federal judiciary and polling places, a 
negative syllogism concludes that the courts 
are apolitical and therefore non-governmental. 
Pupils learn that the independence of the judges 
enables them to remain above the corrupting 
tensions of the political process. The lesson 
further states that instead of making their deci­
sions on the basis of party or personal interest, 
judges rely upon an inanimate and impartial 
body of precedents, which may sometimes be 
misinterpreted but which can never be manipulated.69 
Phillipa Strum clarified this misconception by pre­
senting these additional statements: 
If this theory is inaccurate, it is not only 
the schools which are to blame. The courts 
themselves seemingly attest to its veracity 
by proclaiming a rigid adherence to stare decisis — 
and the only strange element in this situation 
is that they occasionally appear to believe 
their own propaganda. Popular belief in an 
independent judiciary enables the courts to 
place a final stamp of legitimacy upon all gov­
ernmental acts, including those which might 
otherwise come under direct attack in the form 
of disobedience.?0 
Supreme Court decisions are occasionally regarded 
as less than effectual unless these decisions have the 
69phillipa Strum, The Supreme Court, and "Political 
Question": A Study in Judicial Evasion (University, Alabama: 
The University of Alabama Press, 1974), pp. 2-3. 
70Ibid. 
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support of the populace and the other two branches of 
the government. This is especially true if these decisions 
have national effect rather than individual effect. It 
is interesting to speculate whether Supreme Court justices 
vote with their personal conscience, by way of popular 
opinion, or in accordance with the conventional ideology 
of the president's who appointed them to the Court. 
In all likelihood, all three of these factors play important 
roles in the Supreme Court decision-making process depending 
upon the nature of the case, the population alignment, 
and the personal convictions of the individual justices. 
Decisions in school desegregation cases began the 
Warren Court's long involvement in the development of 
race relations law.?l Subsequent opinions underscored 
the universal permanence and enduring nature of the newly 
announced constitutional doctrine in Brown I, which was 
the Supreme Court's new interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.7 2 Segregation was struck down in the public 
parks, in intrastate and interstate commerce, at public 
golf courses and other recreational facilities, in airports 
71The Warren Court, R. H. Sayler, Barry B. Boyer, 
and R. E. Gooding, eds. (New York: Chelsea House, 1968), 
p. 47. 
72ibid. 
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and interstate bus terminals, in libraries, and in the fac­
ilities of public buildings and courtrooms.73 
Perhaps, the voting trend of the United States Supreme 
Court should not be noted with much amazement. Richard 
Funston emphasized the political aspects of the Supreme 
Court in writing: 
The Supreme Court of the United States is a polici-
cal agency. Unless this is fully appreciated 
at the outset, attempts at understanding the 
Court will be in vain. Among judicial bodies 
throughout the world, past as well as present, 
the Court stands out as a uniquely powerful political 
institution. 
•The political eminence of the Supreme Court may be 
viewed in terms of the flexibility of the Court's inter­
pretive powers, but this flexibility may also be evaluated 
in terms of the Court's legal impreciseness where it is 
legal preciseness that the Court has been entrusted to 
render. Moreover, Funston, contended overemphasis of either 
the political nature or the legal nature of the Court to 
the exclusion of the other obscures the essential reality. 
Finally, Richard Funston asserted the political nature 
of the Court: 
73Ibid. 
74Richard Funston, A Vital National Seminar, The Supreme 
Court in America (Palo Alto, Ca.: Mayfield Pub. Co., 1978), 
p. 1. 
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The most rigorous survey done thus far estimates 
that about three-fourths of those justices for 
when an evaluation could be made conformed to 
the expectations of the President who appointed 
them. While this suggests a laudable degree 
of judicial independence (after all, one-fourth 
of the justices did not conform to the expectation 
of their nominators), it also indicates that 
most of the time the Court tends to reflect the 
general values of the political coalition capable 
of electing the president and thus, the values 
of the President himself. 
A President's personal association with a Supreme 
Court nominee is not an imperative alliance, but a parallel 
judicial philosophy is probably desired by the nominating 
President. 
William Beaney expressed the following sentiments 
concerning the influence of recent Presidents: 
The present century has been marked not only 
by short range ebbing and flowing of executive 
power, but also by congressional acceptance of 
a largely ratifying and checking role in its 
relationship with the President. The twentieth 
century clearly is the age of executive initiative 
and administrative government. The great era 
of Congress lies in the past.?® 
According to Alan Barth, the assurance that the Court 
appointees will vote the will of the Presidents who nominated 
them cannot ever be assumed. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt*s court-enlargement 
or court-packinq plan failed; but by the time 
75Ibid. 
76william m. Beaney, "The Warren Court and the Political 
Process," in The Warren Court ed. Richard H. Sayler, Barry 
B. Boyer, and Robert E. Gooding, Jr. (New York: Chelsea 
House 1974), p. 153. 
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the Gobitis?? case came up for review, the President 
had been able to put five of his nominees on 
the Court: Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, 
and Murphy. This majority was, of course, peculiarly 
aware that the Court ought not to operate as 
a super-legislature, second-guessing as it were, 
and imposing its will and judgment upon elected 
representatives directly responsive and accountable 
to the public.78 
Richard Kluger noted that President Eisenhower had 
ranked, the qualities he considered in recommending candidates 
for Court: 
Character and ability that would inspire 'respect, 
pride, and confidence of the populace1 came 
first. Then he looked for high ideals, a moderately 
progressive social philosophy—A middle of the 
roader, in other words, in his own image—and 
a substantial ration of common sense. Judicial 
experience would be helpful but not essential. 
The nominee should give geographic and religious 
balance to the Court and should not be older 
than sixty-two. Both the FBI and American Bar 
Association, furthermore, had to clear the man.79 
Personal friendship as well as politics has often 
been a prevailing influence in United States Supreme Court 
nominations. Former Columbia Broadcasting Correspondent 
Eric Sevareid recorded the following excerpts in an interview 
with William 0. Douglas during the summer of 1972 at Goose 
Praire, Washington: 
77flinersville School District v. Gobitis 310 U.S. 
586 (1940) (Johovah's Witnesses Flag Salute Case). 
78]3arth, p. 113. 
^^Kluger, p. 657. 
Sevareid: I wanted to ask you,. Mr. Justice, about 
some of the well-known people in the last 
generation you've known very well. After 
all, you've been around a long time now— 
thirty-three years on the Court, since 
you were forty years old. Did you get 
really intimate with Franklin Roosevelt, 
who appointed you? 
Douglas: Yes, I got to know him pretty well. 
Sevareid: Why do you think he appointed you? You 
were forty years old, and had that brief 
experience with SEC, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission at that time as I 
remember. 
Douglas: I have no idea. I was not a candidate. 
I had no ambition for any public office. 
As a matter of fact, I had been elected 
Dean of the Yale Law School. I was going 
back there in a few months. . . I often 
wonder what would have happened to Yale 
If I'd been Dean of the Law School. 
Sevareid: Well, I suppose Roosevelt just liked your 
general approach to things. Your general 
cast of mind. You made quite a record 
on the SEC. Wasn't it Joseph Kennedy 
who brought you into the Security Exchange? 
Douglas: Yes, Joe Kennedy brought me down . . . 
in 1934. I didn't know him, but he'd 
heard about me. I'd been active in the 
field, and he brought me down to head 
up the reorganization. 
Sevareid: And why would a man like that want you 
in on reorganizing finance? 
Douglas: 'Cause he knew I knew something about 
it. 80 
80Eric Sevareid, "An Interview with William 0. Douglas 
In Honor of Justice Douglas, ed. Robert H. Keller, Jr. 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1979) pp. 1480150 
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Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong described Justice 
Byron White's association with the late President Kennedy 
with the following statement: 
Byron White clerked a year at the Court for 
Justice Fred Vinson, and renewed his friendship 
with Representative John Kennedy, whom he had 
known in England and later in the South Pacific 
during World War II. He later ran a nationwide 
Citizen for Kennedy Committee during the 1960 
presidential campaign for which he was rewarded 
with the number two post in the Justice Department. 
A year later, President Kennedy appointed White 
to the Court.81 
Woodward and Armstrong also described President 
Richard Nixon's version of an ideal Chief Justice: 
. . . Nixon wanted someone with judicial experience, 
someone whose views were fully predictable, 
not a crony or political friend, someone with 
integrity and administrative ability. Someone 
young enough to serve at least ten years.82 
Most of President Nixon's apointees were Republi­
can loyalists who shared both President Nixon's and President 
Ford's belief in judicial restraint and tended to adopt 
legal interpretations that favored law enforcement agencies 
rather than accused criminals.83 All of President Nixon's 
appointees appear to have met his strict constructionist, 
law-and-order criteria. So has Justice John Paul Stevens, 
SlBob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The B.ret.h.en 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), p. 47. 
82ibid. 
83ibid. 
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President Gerald Ford's selection in 1975.84 President 
Ronald Reagan's nominee, Justice Sandra O'Connor, has 
not served on the High Court long enough for legal historians 
to record a predictable voting trend. 
President Jimmy Careter promised to choose the judges 
he appointed to the federal courts on the basis of "strict 
merit",,not partisan politics. President Carter's pledge, 
however, was unlikely to silence the controversies over 
judicial philosophy that have surrounded the federal 
courts since they were established about 200 years ago.85 
Presidents have been known, however, to react to 
Court decisions in unpredictable fashion. As Gary Orfield 
described: 
When Governor Orval Faubus defied a court order 
in 1951, and Governor George Wallace defied 
one in 1963, Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and 
John Kennedy, respectively, mobilized the executive 
branch in support of the courts. The Nixon 
Administration, however, gave implicit support 
to Governor Claude Kirk efforts to block a busing 
plan in Manatee County School District.86 
Regardless of presidential opinions and desires or 
the populace's zeal, the independence of the Supreme Court 
is thoroughly inscribed in the Constitution of the United 
States. 
84Ibid. 
S^The Supreme Court-Justice and the Law (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1977), p. 4. 
8®Gary Orfield, Must We Bus? (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 329. 
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Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution of the 
United States establishes the concept of complete judicial 
independence for the United States Supreme Court: 
Judicial power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior 
courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and establish.87 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court is given jurisdiction 
by Congress to review the following cases: 
1. All cases in lower federal courts. 
2. All cases in state courts involving a question 
of a federal statute or a constitutional provision. 88 
The following charts illustrate and outline the structure 
of the Federal Court system. The Federal Court system 
provides avenues for court cases to reach the United States 
Supreme Court. 
Personal Profiles of the Justices in 
Relation to Voting Trends 
Introduction 
The 197 3 Keyes decision was the first de facto segrega­
tion decision after Brown I in 1954. Author Gary Orfield 
described the ensusing years in the following manner: 
There is a sense of deja vu as residents of peacful 
cities in the Deep South read about the antibusing 
87U.S., Constitution, art. Ill, sec. 1. 
S^Edward C. Bolmeier, The School in the Legal Structure, 
2nd ed. (Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson Company, 1974), p. 
55. 
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TABLE 2 
FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM 
United States Supreme Court 
9 Justices 
Appeals from lower federal courts or disputes 
between states, or cases involving 
Ambassadors, Consuls, or 
representatives of 
foreign governments 
Courts of Appeal 
Cases on appeal from 
U.S. District Courts 
and review of actions 
of Tax Court and 
federal administrative 
agencies for errors of 
law 
Court of Claims 
Cases in which in­
dividuals and corpora­
tions sue the govern­
ment for money damages 
Court of Customs 
.& Patent Appeals 
Appeals from 
Customs Court, 
Tariff Commis­
sion, and 
Patent Office 
U.S. Tax Court District Courts Customs Court 
Disputes between 
taxpayers and 
Internal Revenue 
Service 
Civil and criminal 
cases (1) involving 
violations of federal 
law; (2) arising under 
federal law; or (3) 
between parties of 
different states 
Cases involving 
classification 
validation of 
imposed merchan­
dise 
TABLE 3 
The Thirteen Federal Judicial Circuits 
See 28 U.S.C.A. } '« 
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amendments to the state constitutions recently 
adopted in the States of California and Washington. 
The North, seemingly unaware that the South 
has passed through many of the same stages, 
appears unwilling to learn anything from that 
experience.89 
Orfield described integration in America's public 
schools in the following manner: 
During the 1962-63 school year, 99 of every 
100 southern black children were in all-black 
schools. Only 14 of every 100 were in all-blacks 
schools in 1974-75. (Thirty-two percent of 
the black students in the Northeast, and 45 
percent in the Northwest, were in schools with 
virtually no whites in 1974-75). During 1974-75, 
44 percent of southern black children attended 
predominantly white schools, compared with less 
than a fourth in the West (Congressional Record, 
June 18, 1976). Calculations by the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) based 
on 1976 enrollment statistics found that blacks 
in the Northeast were more than twice as likely 
to be segregated (Washington Post, September 
1,2 1978).90 
Perhaps these statistics can be partially attributed 
to the majority voting record of the Burger Court in de 
facto school segregation cases. 
Stephen Wasby wrote: 
A court in transition, whether the Burger Court 
or some other court, is Tdivided, uncertain, 
and adrift;' its doctrinal path is 'sawtooth 
S^Gary Orfield, "Why It Worked in Dixie: Southern 
School Desegregation and Its Implications for the North," 
in Race and Schooling in the City, ed. Adorn Yarmolinsky, 
Lance Liebman, and Corinne S. Schelling (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1981), p. 24. 
90lbid. 
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rather than linear.'91 
Therefore, a profile of each sitting justice since the 
1973 Keyes case should offer a base to blend former decisive 
Court decisions with the seemingly ambiguous present and 
perhaps some future decisions in school desegregation 
chases. In addition, the brief profile should project 
some indication of the viewpoints of each of the following 
eleven justices of the United State Supreme Court. 
Chief Justic Warren E. Burger 
Born: St. Paul, Minn. 
Education: B.A., University of Minnesota, 1927, 
LL. B., magna cum laude St. Paul College 
of Law (now Mitchell College of Law), 
1931. 
Chief Justice Warren Burger, said to be strongly 
task-oriented, took a position favorable to the United 
States government in 70 percent of the cases available 
in his first term, as compared to Chief Justice Earl Warren, 
who voted for the government 19 percent of the time in 
criminal cases over sixteen years.92 
After the noted Swann decision, the Houston Chronicle 
published the following comments on April 22, 197 6: 
The Burger Supreme Court, at least in matters 
of school integration, has proven to be virtually 
yiStephen L. Wasby, Continuity and Change (Pacific 
Palisades, California: Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc., 
1976), p. 2. 
92ibid., p. 24 
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indistinguishable from the old Warren Court. 
After the Supreme Court in 1974 Detroit decision, 
the following comment was published in the Chicago Daily 
Defender July 30, 1974 edition: 
Justice Warren Burger's opinion that the lower 
courts had authorized a wholly impermissible 
remedy by including 53 Detroit suburban school 
districts in the integration plan, is a reasoning 
whose rationale is consonant with racist thinking. 
This is a Nixon victory by a Nixon Court.94 
A summary of Chief Justice Warren Burger's voting 
record in school integration cases includes the following: 
A dissent vote in Wright v. Emporia City Council 
(5-4 vote that the federal court can halt state or local 
action creating new school districts with the effect of 
impeding school desegregation)'. 95 
A concurring vote in the San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez decision (5-4 vote that equal 
protection guarantee does not require that courts give 
the strictest scruntiny to state decisions to finance 
public schools from local property taxes).- This decision 
will cause wide disparities among districts in the amount 
93witt, The Supreme Court Justice and, the Law 
p. 55. 
94Judith F. Buncher, The School Busing Controversy, 
1970-75 (New York: Facts on File, 1975), p. 39. 
95ty/right v. Emporia City Council, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). 
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spent per pupil.96 
A concurring vote in the Keyes v.. Denver School 
District No. 1 (7-1 vote which held that school officials 
were required to desegregate a school system if the segre­
gation was caused by the policies of the school board).97 
A concurring vote in the Lou v. Nichols decision 
(a 9-0 vote that upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that 
school officials must provide non-English-speaking students 
in their system remedial English instruction, bilingual 
classes, or some other methods.98 
A concurring vote in Millik.en v. Bradley (5-4 
vote where the court reversed a lower court's order directing 
busing across city, county and district lines in order 
to desegregate the schools of Detroit, Michigan).99 
A concurring vote in Pasadena City Board of 
Education v. Spanqler (6-2 vote that once a school board 
has implemented a racially netural plan for attendance 
of students at city schools, the board is not required 
to continue juggling student assignments in order to maintain 
9®san Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 13 (1973) 
97Keyes v. Denver School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 
189. 
98lou v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
"Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) 
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a racial balance in each school).100 
A concurring vote in both Columbus Board of 
Education v. Gary L. Penick10! and in Dayton Board of 
Education v. Brinkman^Q^ where district-wide busing plans 
were upheld. 
A concurring vote in Crawford v. Board of Education 
of the City of Los Angeles (8-1 vote that state court 
cannot mandate busing for racial and ethnic purposes.1^3 
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger is customarily viewed 
as a conservative. 
William Orville Douglas 
Born: Maine, Minn. 
Education: B.A. Whitman College, 1920, Phi Beta Kappa, 
LL. B. Columbia Law School, 1925. 
The Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the United 
States Supreme. Court described Justice William 0. Douglas 
with the following statements: 
By the time the Depression struck in 1929, Douglas 
had already developed a reputation as one of 
the country's foremost financial law experts. 
lOOpasadena city Board of Education v. Spangler, 
427 U.S. 424 (1976) 
lOlcolumbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 
449 (1979) 
102j3ayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 
449, (1979). 
lO^Crawford v. Board of Education of the City of 
Los Angeles, No. 81-38 (Slip Opinion), 1982. 
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So when President Franklin D. Roosevelt needed 
staff for the newly formed Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), created in 1934, he called 
on Douglas, who joined the commission in 1936; 
he became its chairman in 1937. 
Douglas' 1939 Supreme Court nomination sailed 
through the Senate. Such easy relations with 
Congress, however, were not to mark Douglas' 
forthcoming years in Washington. Twice he faced 
the threat of impeachment, although neither 
in 1953 nor in 1970 did the move gain any real 
support. 
Douglas* lifestyle and liberal political views—plus 
conservative resentment at the Senate's rejection 
of two of President Nixon's Supreme Court nominees— 
were the main spur behind the 1970 impeachment 
attempt. The justice's relations with the Parvin 
Foundation, recipient of considerable income 
from gambling interests, were held up for scrutiny. 
Anti-establishment sentiments expressed in one 
of his many books further fueled the attack. 
His controversial marital history also raised 
congressional eyebrows. But a special House 
Judiciary Subcommittee created to investigate 
the charges found no grounds for impeachment. 
Douglas suffered a paralytic stroke in January 
1975. At first, Douglas attempted to continue 
his work on the court, but in November 1975 
he resigned, citing the pain and physical disability 
resulting from the stroke. At the time of his 
retirement, he had served 36 years and seven 
months, longer than any other justice.104 
Associate Justice William 0. Douglas' decision distin­
guished him as one of the more liberal justices on the 
United States Supreme Court. 
104Eicler Witt ed., Guide to U.S. Supreme Court (Wash­
ington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1979), p. 60. 
Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. 
Born: 1906, Newark, New Jersey 
Education: B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1928 
LL. B., Harvard Law School, 1941 
Justice William Brennan is described in The Supreme 
Court, Justice and The Law, with the following remarks: 
During the first dozen years as a justice, Brennan 
often spoke for the liberal majority of the 
Warren Court, sharing its belief that the courts 
were the guardians of the individual rights, 
obligated to act when other parts of the government 
failed to do so. It was Brennan in 1962 who 
wrote the opinion asserting the court's jurisdiction 
over the 'political' question of electoral districts, 
clearing the way for enuciation of the 'one 
person, one vote', standard for redistricting.105 
William Brennan, a former member of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, is a liberal, Catholic 
Democrat, who satisfied President Eisenhower's 
need for a nominee'with judicial experience 
after he had been criticized for naming former 
Vice-Presidential candidate Earl Warren, who 
had no previous judicial experience, to be Chief 
Justice. 
Stephen Wasby described Justice William Brennan as 
a member of the Court's liberal wing who seldom dissented 
from his position.^0® 
. . . However, as the Court's idological position 
shifted during the transition, he sopke out 
more and more frequently along with Justices 
Douglas and Marshall. During the Warren Court, 
Brennan attempted to develop a coherent position 
on the standards by which allegedly obscenity 
material should be judged, although his success 
in gaining a majority to support his position 
105wj.tt, The Supreme Court-Justice, p. 51. 
106wasby, p. 
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was not great. Because of the difficulty in 
defining abscenity, Brennan has now moved toward 
a position of deregulating it.107 
Associate Justice Potter Steward 
Born: 1915, Jackson, Michigan 
education: B.A. , Yale Univeristy, exam laude, 1937 
fellow, Cambridge University, 1937-38, 
LL. B., cum laude, Yale Law School, 1941; 
Before becoming a member of the United States Court, 
Potter Stewart had been active in politics and in the 
judicial system. He had served on the city council and 
as vice mayor of Cincinnati, Ohio before becoming a judge 
on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the sixth circuit.108 
The Guide to U.S. Supreme Court presents the following 
description of Justice Potter Stewart: 
Stewart is the son of an established middle-class 
Cincinnati family with a strong tradition of public 
service and respect for the benefits of a good edu­
cation. Stewart's father, James Garfield Stewart, 
was major of Cincinnati from 1938 to 1947 and was 
the Republican nominee for governor of Ohio in 1944. 
He served on the Ohio supreme court from 1947 until 
his death in 1959. 
After early schooling in Cincinaati, Stewart was 
sent to two of the most prestigious eastern schools— 
Hotchkiss preparatory and Yale University, where 
he received numerous academic honors and graduated 
Phi Beta Kappa in 1937. After completing his under­
graduate work at Yale, he spent a year abroad doing 
post graduate work at Cambridge University in England. 
Returning to the United States in 1938, he began 
law school at Yale. After graduation 1941, Stewart 
moved to New York, where he joined a Wall Street 
law firm. He had hardly begun work there, however, 
107ibid., p. 21 
108witt, Guide, p. 68. 
when World War II broke out and he joined the 
Navy. Stewart found himself a deck officer 
aboard oil tankers plying the Atlantic and Med­
iterranean. 
After the war, Stewart at first returned to 
his New York law practice but soon moved to 
his home town of Cincinnati, where he joined 
one of its leading law firms. 
Once Stewart settled in Cincinnati, he took 
up the family's tradition of public service. 
He was twice elected to the city council and 
served one term as vice major. He was also 
actively involved in the 1948 and 1952 Republican 
presidential campaigns. In both years, he supported 
the efforts of his friend Senator Robert A 
Taft to secure the Republican presidential nom­
ination. When Eisenhower won the party's endorse­
ment instead in 1952, Stewart actively supported 
him in the fall campaign. 
Stewart's appointment in 1954 to the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the sixth circuit ended his direct 
participation in politics. He was President 
Eisenhower's fifth and last appointment to the 
Supreme Court. He received a recess appointment 
in 1958, and Eisenhower sent his nomination 
to the new Congress early in 1959.109 
Associate Justice Byron R. White 
Born: 1917, Fort Collins, Colorado 
Education: B.A., University of Colorado, Phi Beta 
Kappa, 1938; Rhodes Scholar..Oxford 
University, 1939; LL. B., Yale Law School 
magna cum laude, 1946 
Although Byron White was nominated to the Supreme 
Court by President John F. Kennedy in 1962, he is said 
to fit President Richard Nixon's description of a "strict 
constructionist". He has the reputation of taking liberal 
109Ibid. 
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approach to legal issues, leavened at times by his pragmatic 
assessment of circumstances.HO 
Stephens Wasby described Justice White with this 
observation: 
Bryon White is perhaps best known because of 
his *swing position *, a result of more conservative 
coming to the Court. During the Warren Court 
years, he often differed with colleagues. 'Over­
timing, public acceptance and the effectiveness 
of the Court overtime.1 He dissented frequently, 
both in criminal procedure cases and on other 
civil liberties issues. When he joined the 
majority, it was often on extremely narrow grounds. 
At best a moderate, White leans toward the govern­
ment's position in a great many cases 'His opinions 
show great sympathy for the official—whether 
cabinet officer or patrolman—who is given a 
messy complicted job without the resources or 
the training he really needs and then is second-
guessed by judges after the event." Portrayed 
when they clash with government actions and 
worse, 'an icy aloofness' toward those in the 
civil rights movement. Such a justice, even 
if appointed originally by Kennedy, certainly 
fits well into the Nixon mold.m 
Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall 
Born: 1908, Baltimore,Md. 
Education: A.B., cum laude, Lincoln University, 
1930; LL. B., Howard University Law School, 
1933 
When President Johnson named Thurgood Marshall to 
the Supreme Court in 1967, he became the Court's first 
black justice. At fifty-nine, he was the ninety-sixth 
man to serve on the nation's highest court when Justice 
llOwitt, The Supreme Court Justice, p. 22. 
IHwasby, p. 22. 
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Tom Clark stepped down.H^ • Thurgood Marshall had won 29 
of the 32 cases he argued before the Supreme Court for 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People Legal Defense and Educational Fund.H^ 
Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong related the political 
relationship between President Lyndon Johnson and Justice 
Thurgood ̂ Marshall: 
In 1965, Lyndon Johnson appointed Marshall Solicitor 
General. When Marshall hesitated, Johnson's 
closing argument was, 'I want folks to walk 
down the hall of the Justice Department and 
look in the door and see a nigger sitting there.1 
Two years later Johnson appointed Marshall to 
the Supreme Court. Marshall had not sought 
and had not wanted the appointment. He preferred 
the more active give-and-take of public interest 
law. His jurisprudence was long settled; so 
at conference, Marshall was relaxed, almost 
intuitively reaching his common-sense solution. 
He had not fit easily into the Warren liberal 
majority. Plain spoken and direct, Marshall 
saw his job as casting his vote and urging his 
colleagues to do what was right. On the Court, 
he had little interest in perfecting the finer 
points of the law. He often told his clerks 
only half jokingly, 'I'll do whatever Bill [Brennan] 
does', sometimes even jotting 'follow Bill' 
on his notes. He trusted Brennan's resolution 
on the detailed, technical questions of legal 
scholarship. The clerks had taken to calling 
Marshall 'Mr. Justice Brennan-Marshall'. Often 
he would follow White on antitrust cases. But 
on discrimination, Marshall followed no one.H4 
H2iQUgerf p. 760. 
113witt, The Supreme Court Justice, p. 54. 
H4w00awar(3 ana Armstrong, p. 48. 
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Associate Justice Harry A. Blackmun 
Born: 1908, Nashville, 111. 
Education: B.A., Harvard University, Phi Beta Kappa, 
summa cum laude in mathematics, 1929; 
LL. B., Harvard Law School, 1932 
Justice Harry Blackmun has been viewed as a pale carbon 
copy of Chief Justice Burger.^5 Bob Woodward and Scott 
Armstrong Contended that Justice Blackmun had authored 
some of the opinions of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in the Little Rock desegregation cases, yet Justice Blackmun 
worried that McMillan's order would destroy the role played 
by neighborhood schools in formulating community values. 
Author Stephen Wasby gave a portrait of Justice Harry 
Blackmun with the following comments: 
Justice Blackmun is thoughtful and restrained 
in position and tone. Blackmun often makes 
use of a distinction between what he could do 
as a legislator and what he can do as a judge, 
where he cannot substitute his own wisdom for 
the legislators. This position was expressed 
most clearly in his dissent from the Court's 
invalidation of the death penalty. Blackmun 
said he 'yielded to no one in the depth of my 
distaste, antipathy, and, indeed abhorrence, 
for the death penalty, with all its aspects 
of physical distress and fear and morals of 
judgment exercised by finite minds; and found 
that 'capitol punishment serves no useful purpose 
that can be demonstrated, and violates childhood 
training and life's experiences.' As a legisla­
tor, he said, he would sponsor legislation and 
vote to repeal the penalty and might as a governor, 
H5Kluger, p. 764. 
H^Woodward ancj Armstrong, p. 106. 
use the pardon power. But he said, 'There—on 
the Legislative Branch' of the State or Federal 
Government, and secondarily, on the Executive 
Branch—is where the authority and responsibility 
for this kind of action lies', not on the federal 
judiciary. Despite the clarity of this stance, 
Blackmun did not use it in the abortion cases, 
where he wrote for the majority in invalidating 
anti-abortion laws. Off the bench, freed some­
what of his institutional responsibilities, 
Blackmun has spoken out on Watergate, calling 
for the removal of the 'taint and corruption 
in our public life' and citing the 'misplaced 
loyalties . . . strange measures of the unethical, 
. . . unusual doings in high places, and by 
lawyer, after lawyer, after lawyer,' as a result 
of which 'The very glue of our ship of state 
seems about to become unstuck.'117 
Associate Justice Lewis F. Powell 
Born: 1907, Suffolk, Va. 
Education: B.S., Washington and Lee University, 
Phi Beta Kappa, 1929; LL. B., Washington 
and Lee University Law School, 1931; 
LL. M., Harvard Law School, 1932 
Justice Lewis F. Powell is viewed as a moderate or 
a careful conservative.Editor Elder Witt wrote the 
following about Justice Lewis Powell: 
Following his appointment to the Supreme Court 
in 1971 by President Richard Nixon, Justice 
Lewis Powell continued to build a reputation 
as a moderate and according to observers, quickly 
rose to a position of influence among the other 
eight justices, disproportionate to his low 
seniority on the court. 
Powell's reputation as a moderate stemmed from 
his work as president from 1952-61 of the Richmond 
School Board, and later as a member of the State 
H7wasby, pp. 22-23. 
118witt, The Supreme Court Justice p. 
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Board of Education. According to civil rights 
advocates in Richmond, Powell, in the face of 
intense pressure to 'massively* resist desegrega­
tion, consistently advocated keeping the city 
schools open. 
. . .  O n  t h e  l i b e r a l  s i d e ,  P o w e l l  s p o k e  o u t  
against inadequate legal services for the poor 
and worked to create the legal services program 
of the Office of Economic Opportunity. A more 
conservative tone characterized his pronouncements 
against 'excessive tolerance' by parents and 
stern denunciation of civil disobedience and 
other forms of civil demonstrations. As a member 
of President Johnson's 1966 Crime Commission, 
Powell participated in a minority statement 
criticizing Supreme Court rulings upholding 
the right of criminal suspects to remain silent. 
Powell was the only Democrat among President 
Nixon's Supreme Court appointees. 
Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist 
Born: 1929, Milwaukee, Wis. 
Education: A.B., Stanford University, Phi Beta Kappa, 
1948, M.A., Harvard University in Political 
science, 1950; LL. B., Stanford University 
Law School, 1952 
President Nixon wanted a judicial conservative who 
would not twist or bend the Constitution in order to per­
petuate his personal, political, and social values.120 
Justice William Rehnquist, who was Assistant Attorney 
General at the time of his nomination, was well known 
for his strong conservative ideological position.121 
H^ibid. 
120wasby, p. 31. 
121ibid. 
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President Nixon's had certain concerns about nominating 
Rehnquist: 
It would look like an in-house appointment, 
and Rehnquist was relatively unknown in establishment 
legal circles. A former clerk to Justice Robert 
Jackson in 1952, Rehnquist had practiced law 
for sixteen years in Phoenix where he was part 
of Goldwater wing of the Republican Party. 
He had joined the Justice Department to head 
the Office of Legal Counsel as an Assistant 
Attorney General in 1969. He had been, in effect, 
Attorney General Mitchell's lawyer. 
. . . Nixon had some trouble remembering Rehniquist's 
name. He once called him 'Renchburg'. He was 
also taken aback by the easygoing lawyer's appear­
ance, once referring to him as 'that clown', 
because of his long sideburns and pink shirts. 
But Rehnquist was very bright and extremely 
conservative, and at forty-seven, he could be 
expected to serve many years.122 
Richard Kluger wrote that a memo written 19 years 
earlier by William Rehnquist nearly cost the Justice his 
Senate confirmation.123 Rehnquist had written the memo 
during the Brown I case at Justice Robert Jackson's request 
to reflect that Justice's views. Justice William 0. 
Douglas stated to his clerks, that the memo did indeed 
express former Justice Robert Jackson's views.124 
Associate Justice William Rehnquist's voting record 
thus far indicates that he can be depended upon to cast 
a conservative vote in school desegregation cases. 
122w00dWard and Armstrong, p. 161. 
123Rluger, p. 604. 
124woodward and Armstrong, p. 163. 
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Associate Just-ice John Paul -Stevens 
Born: 1920, Chicago, 111. 
Education: B.A., University of Chicago, Phi Beta 
Kappa, 1941; J.D., Northwestern University 
School of Law, magna cum laude, 1947 
John Paul Stevens was nominated by President Gerald 
Ford in 1975, to replace Justice William 0. Douglas on 
the Supreme Court. He was described as a small, modest 
man from the Midwest, solid, with a subtle humor.125 
He was also described as follows: 
Blunt, down to earth and possessed of an open 
judicial mind, Stevens has displayed a faculty 
for constitutional line-drawing.1^6 
Author Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong rendered 
this account of Justice Stevens: 
. . .  H e  w a s  p l e a s e d  t o  b e  n o m i n a t e d  t o  s u c c e e d  
Douglas. After graduating first in his class 
from Northwestern Law School, Stevens had clerked 
at the Supreme Court for Justice Wiley Rutledge 
in 1947. Douglas had, at that point, already 
been a Supreme Court Justice for eight years. 
Stevens greatly admired Douglas. 
Stevens' nomination was well received in Washington. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee quickly requested 
voluminous information about his personal, financial, 
academic, legal and judicial background. 'I've 
gone through discovery in antitrust hearings,' 
Stevens told his clerks as he compiled his records, 
'but never anything like this'. His net worth 
was $170,000 including a $125,000 house, two 
cars, and one airplane. 
125woodward and Armstrong, p. 401. 
126witt, The Supreme Court Justice, p. 59. 
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The hearing on his nomination opened uneventfully 
on December 8. The Committee consensus held 
that Stevens was an obscure, scholarly, thoughtful 
lawyer and judge. Two days later, he was confirmed 
by the full Senate 98 to 0^27 
Justice John Paul Stevens is said to be a member 
of the liberal wing of the Supreme Court. 
Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor 
Bqrn: 1930, 
Education: B.A., Stanford University, magna cum 
laude, 1950; LL. B., Stanford University 
Law School, 1952 
President Ronald Regan's appointment of Justice Sandra 
O'Connor was the first woman in the 191-year history of 
the Supreme Court. Justice O'Connor was serving at the 
time as a judge of the Arizona Court of Appeals and had 
earlier been a Superior Court judge in Phoenix and before 
that a member of the Arizona Senate.128 
The Current Biography Yearbook of 1982 stated the 
following about Justice Sandra O'Connor: 
As an exponent of judicial restraint, Mrs. O'Connor 
is not expected to be an instrument of social 
change on the Supreme Court bench. Her prominence, 
however, as a role for women, especially for 
women lawyers, and as a symbol of women's improving 
status is itself an encouragement of social 
change. Linda Greenhouse of the New York Times 
(October 9, 1981) looked at her appointment 
from another angle: 'Of the ways in which Sandra 
O'Connor is different from the other Justices, 
her political savvy, relative youth, and continued 
openness to the world at large are at least 
127woodward and Armstrong, pp. 401-402. 
128charies Moritz, ed., Current Biography Yearbook, 
(New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1982), p. 298. 
as significant as gender. Sex may turn out to be 
the least important difference of all*. 
. . . Discrimination against women was to be 
a major concern of Mrs. O'Connor as a state 
legislator and judge, although she has said 
that she had personally experienced little of 
it. She did, however, encounter prejudice when 
she applied for a job after leaving law school. 
'I interviewed with law firms in Los Angeles 
and San Francisco', she related in the Times 
interview, 'but none had ever hired a woman 
before as a lawyer, and they were not prepared 
to do1. One Los Angeles firm, of which William 
French Smith, now Attorney General, was a partner, 
offered to hire her as a legal secretary. 
. . . On September 15, all but one of the eighteen 
members of the Judiciary Committee voted in 
her favor. Senator Jeremiah Dewton, Republican 
of Alabama, voted 'present'. Although he did 
not oppose her nomination, he hesitated to endorse 
it because she declined to criticize the 1973 
decision on the Supreme Court that legalized 
abortions. 
. . .  I n  a n  o p e n i n g  s t a t e m e n t  t o  t h e  S e n a t e  
Judiciary Committee on the first day of her 
confirmation hearings, September 9, Mrs. O'Connor 
assured her inquisitors that she was an advocate 
of judicial restraints 'Judges are not only 
authorized to engage in executive or legislative 
functions, they are also ill-equipped to do 
so,' 
. . . She has had little opportunity in her 
written opinions to make known her views on 
the important controversial social issues that 
had occupied the Supreme Court in recent years. 
129ibid. 
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United States Supreme Court's Vote in 
Landmark desegregation cases 
(Eleven Cases) 
The following cases present the United States Supreme 
Court's majority vote in landmark desegregation cases 
over a span of 28 years. The division of the court on 
school desegregation cases can be noted with the passing 
of time. 
TABLE 4 
The United States Supreme Court - 1954 
Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al. 
347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
Separate but equal-schools held unconstitutional 
(de jure segregation) 
Name Appointed Nominated bv Vote 
Earl Warren (4) 1954 Eisenhower C 
Hugo L. Black 1937 F. Roosevelt C 
Stanley P. Reed 1938 F. Roosevelt C 
Felix Frankfurter 1939 F. Roosevelt C 
William 0. Douglas 1939 F. Roosevelt C 
Robert H. Jackson 1941 F. Roosevelt C 
Harold H. Burton 1945 Truman 
Tom C. Clark 1949 Truman C 
Sherman Minton 1949 Truman c 
Legend: C - Concur D - Dissent 
Total Concurring Votes - 9 
60 
TABLE 5 
The United States Supreme Court - 1969 
Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education 
396 U.S. 976 (1969) 
Implementation ordered of Mississippi desegregation plans on 
October 29, 1969 
(de jure segregation) 
Name Appointed Nominated by Vote 
Warren E. Burger (4) 1969 Nixon C 
Hugo L. Black 1937 F. Roosevelt C 
William 0. Douglas 1939 F. Roosevelt C 
John M. Harlan 1955 Eisenhower C 
William J. Brennan, Jr. 1956 Eisenhower C 
Potter Stewart 1958 Eisenhower C 
Byron R. White 1962 Kennedy C 
Thurgood Marshall 1967 Johnson C 
Harry A. Blackmun 1970 Nixon X 
Legend: C - Concur D - Dissent X - Not Yet Seated 
Total Concurring Votes - 8 
61 
TABLE 6 
The United States Supreme Court - 1969 
Powell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools 
396 U.S. (1969) 
Boundary changes for desegregation approved 
Name Appointed Nominated by Vote 
Warren E. Burger 1969 Nixon C 
Hugo L. Black 1937 F. Roosevelt C 
William 0. Douglas 1939 F. Roosevelt C 
John M. Harlen 1955 Eisenhower C 
William J. Brennan 1956 Eisenhower C 
Potter Stewart 1958 Eisenhower C 
Byron R. White 1962 Kennedy C 
Thurgood Marshall 1967 Johnson C 
Harry Blackmun 1970 Nixon X 
Legend: C - Concur D - Dissent 
Total Concurring Votes 
X - Not Yet Seated 
- 8 
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TABLE 7 
The United States Supreme Court - 1971 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 
403 U.S. 912 (1971) 
Required implementation of desegregation plan involving 
extensive busing (de jure segregation ) 
Name Appointed Nominated by Vote 
Warren E. Burger 1969 Nixon C 
Hugo L. Black 1937 F. Roosevelt C 
William 0. Douglas 1939 F. Roosevelt C 
John M. Harlan 1955 Eisenhower C 
William J. Brennan 1956 Eisenhower C 
Potter Stewart 1958 Eisenhower C 
Byron R. White 1962 Kennedy C 
Thurgood Marshall 1967 Johnson C 
Lewis F. Powell 1970 Nixon C 
Legend: C - Concur D - Dissent 
Total Concurring Votes - 9 
63 
TABLE 8 
The United States Supreme Court - 1973 
Wilfred Keyes v. School District No. 1 
413 U.S. 189 (1973) 
Suit to compel desegregation of Denver City Schools. 
Recommended when plaintiffs failed to prove 
de jure segregation 
Name Appointed Nominated by Vote 
Warren E. Burger (4) 1969 Nixon C 
William 0. Douglas 1939 F. Roosevelt C 
William J. Brennan 1956 Eisenhower C 
Potter Stewart 1958 Eisenhower C 
Byron R. White 1962 Kennedy N 
Thurgood Marshall 1967 Johnson C 
Harry A. Blackmun 1970 Nixon C 
Lewis F. Powell 1972 Nixon C/D 
William H. Rehnquist 1972 Nixon D 
Legend: C - Concur D - Dissent C/D - Concur in Part 
N - Nonparticipant 
Total Concurring Votes - 7 
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TABLE 9 
The United States Supreme Court - 1974 
Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I) 
418 U.S. 717 (1974) 
Interdistrict desegregation plan disapproved 
(de facto segregation) 
Name Appointed Nominated by Vote 
Warren E. Burger (4) 1969 Nixon C 
William 0. Douglas 1939 F. Roosevelt D 
William J. Brennan 1956 Eisenhower D 
Potter Stewart 1958 Eisenhower C 
Byron R. White 1962 Kennedy D 
Thurgood Marshall 1967 Johnson D 
Harry A. Blackmun 1970 Nixon C 
Lewis F. Powell 1972 Nixon C 
William H. Rehnquist 1972 Nixon C 
Legend: C - Concur D - Dissent 
Total Concurring Votes - 5 
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TABLE 10 
The United Spates Supreme Court - 1976 
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Nancy Anne Spanql er 
427 U.S. 
(de facto 
424 (1976) 
segregation) 
Name Appointed Nominated by Vote 
Warren E. Burger (4) 1969 Nixon C 
William Brennan 1956 Eisenhower D 
Potter Stewart 1958 Eisenhower C 
Byron R. White 1962 Kennedy C 
Thurgood Marshall 1967 Johnson D 
Harry A. Blackmun 1970 Nixon C 
Lewis F. Powell 1972 Nixon C 
William H. Rehnquist 1972 Nixon C 
John P. Stevens 1975 Ford N 
Legend: C - Concur D - Dissent N - Nonparticipant 
Total Concurring Votes - 6 
TABLE 11 
The United States Supreme Court - 1977 
Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II) 
433 U.S. 627 (1977) 
State must bear half of cost of remedial education to 
overcome effects of de jure segregation 
Name Appointed Nominated by Vote 
Warren E. Burger (4) 1969 Nixon C 
William J. Brennan 1956 Eisenhower C 
Potter Stewart 1958 Eisenhower C 
Byron White 1962 Kennedy C 
Thurgood Marshall 1967 Johnson C 
Harry Blackmun 1970 Nixon C 
Lewis F. Powell 1972 Nixon C 
William H. Rehnquist 1972 Nixon C 
John P. Stevens 1975 Ford C 
Legend: C - Concur D - Dissent 
Total Concurring Vote - 9 
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TABLE 12 
The United States Supreme Court - 1977 
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (Dayton I) 
433 U.S. 406 (1977) 
Plan to correct racial balance by busing - Disapproved 
Name Appointed Nominated by Vote 
Warren E. Burger (4) 1969 Nixon C 
William J. Brennan 1956 Eisenhower C 
Potter Stewart 1958 Eisenhower C 
Byron White 1962 Kennedy C 
Thurgood Marshall 1967 Johnson N 
Harry Blackmun 1970 Nixon C 
Lewis F. Powell 1972 Nixon C 
William H. Rehnquist 1972 Nixon C 
John P. Stevens 1975 Ford C 
Legend: C - Concur D - Dissent N - Nonparticipant 
Total Concurring Votes - 8 
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TABLE 13 
The United States Supreme Court - 1982 
Crawford v. Board of Education of the City of Los Angeles 
No. 81-38 (Slip Opinion) (1982) 
Statewide voter ratification of Proposition I to prevent state 
courts from mandating reassignment of pupils and busing for 
racial and ethnic purpose held constitutional 
Name Appointed Nominated by Vote 
Warren E. Burger (4) 1969 Nixon C 
William J. Brennan 1956 Eisenhower C 
Byron White 1962 Kennedy C 
Thurgood Marshall 1967 Johnson D 
Harry Blackmun 1970 Nixon C 
Lewis F. Powell 1972 Nixon C 
William H. Rehnquist 1972 Nixon C 
John P. Stevens 1975 Ford C 
Sandra O'Connor 1981 Reagan C 
Legend: C - Concur D - Dissent 
Total Concurring Votes - 8 
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TABLE 14 
The United States Supreme Court - 1982 
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 
No. 81-9 (Slip Opinion) 1982 
Statewide voter-approved Initiative 350 to terminate 
involuntary busing for racial intergration held unconstitutional 
Name Appointed Nominated by Vote 
Warren E. Burger (4) 1969 Nixon D 
William J. Brennan 1956 Eisenhower C 
Byron White 1962 Kennedy C 
Thurgood Marshall 1967 Johnson C 
Harry Blackmun 1970 Nixon C 
Lewis F. Powell 1972 Nixon D 
William H. Rehnquist 1972 Nixon D 
John P. Stevens 1975 Ford C 
Sandra O'Connor 1981 Reagan C 
Legend: C - Concur D - Dissent 
Total Concurring Votes - 5 
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Congressional Mandates Pertaining to 
Busing and School Desegregation 
Introduction 
Congressional activities, like recent United States 
Supreme Court decisions, are not of a single philosophy. 
Federal laws pertaining to the busing of children for 
school desegregation normally fall within one of three 
categories. First, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides 
legislative authority upon which, many busing orders and 
plans have been based. Second, some legislation provides 
financial support for desegregating school districts. 
Third, legislation has been enacted to limit the use of 
school busing as a remedy for segregation.130 
Arguments For and Against Busing 
James B. stedman outlined the general arguments made 
by proponents and opponents of busing with the following 
annotations: 
Arguments in favor of busing: 
1. Busing is in most districts the only remedy that 
can successfully desegregate schools. Desegregated 
housing that would permit neighborhood school 
assignments is unlikely to be a reality in the 
near future. 
2. The furor over busing is out of proportion to 
the amount of busing that actually takes place. 
130james b. Stedman, Busing for School Desegregation, 
Issue Brief No. IB81010. (Washington, D.C.: The Library 
of Congress Congressional Research Service, 1982), p. 7. 
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The majority of all public school children 
ride buses to school, but only a small fraction 
are bused \.o desegregate. 
3. The academic achievement of black students 
generally improves in desegregated classrooms, 
and that of white students rarely. The aca­
demic risks involved in busing are minimal 
and the possible gains are significant. 
4. Although the movement of white students out 
of desegreating school systems ('white flight") 
may be exacerbated by busing, busing is not 
the cause of this flight and the increase 
is only temporary. 
5. At its heart, the opposition to busing is 
largely racist in nature and reflects opposition 
to desegregation of this country's schools. 
Attacks on school busing merely mask this 
more fundamental position. Busing to maintain 
segregated schools elicited no public outcry 
that the bus ride itself might in some way 
be harmful to the children. Only when the 
bus ride ended at desegregated schools has 
there been opposition to busing per se. 
Arguments against busing: 
1. The polarizing effects of busing plans and 
their requisite expense deflect attention, 
energy and resources from critically important 
efforts to improve the educational quality 
of the school. 
2. Public opinion polls have shown substantial 
opposition to school busing for desegregation. 
At the same time, support for desegregated 
schooling has been growing. The opposition 
to busing is, thus, focused on the means 
being used, not the end to be achieved. 
3. The costs, not only the financial ones, of 
busing for desegregation appear far in excess 
of any educational gains experienced by black 
students. The record is confused about the 
actual impact of desegregated schooling on 
black achievement. Desegregated schooling 
is not necessary for black students' achievement. 
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4. The busing of students for desegregation 
can generate 'white flight', ironically leading 
to resegregation of the school systems. 
5. Busing is no longer being used to desegregate 
schools; rather it is being used to bring 
about racial balance in the schools. As 
a result, the shifting of students to satisfy 
numerical racial quotas dominates other, 
more important, concerns such as the potentially 
negative impact of long distance bus rides 
on children's health and educational progress, 
and the degree to which the segregation being 
remedied can be attributed to things beyond 
the control of school officials, such as 
housing patterns.131 
Both proponents and opponents of busing provide thought­
ful postulations to support their contentions. The logic 
offered for either position on busing is often persuasive 
and factual. 
Federal Statutes 
The Congress of the United States has amended several 
existing Federal statutes in the area of school busing. 
These laws have been changed to have an opposite effect 
since the Brown era when de jure segregation was a reality 
in most southern states. The basis of many legal cases 
on school desegregation has been the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, of which Section 601 states: 
No person in the United States shall, on the 
grounds of race, color, or national origin, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
131ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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under any program or activity receiving Federal finan­
cial assistance.^32 
Section 602 of the same Act dissects each Federal 
department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal 
financial assistance to "effectuate the provisions of Section 
601 with respect to . . . issuing rules, regulations or 
orders . . . consistent with achievement of the objec­
tives" . 133 
Title VII of the Educational Amendments of 1972 (P.L. 
92-318), the Emergency School Aid Act, was established 
by Congress to assist communities with desegregation. 
Section 703 (b) of this Act states: 
It is the policy of the United States that guidelines 
and criteria established pursuant to Title VI. 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Section 182 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments 
of 1966 shall be applied uniformly in all regimes 
of the United States in dealing with conditions 
of segregation by race whether de jure or de 
facto in the school educational agencies of any 
state without regard to the origin or cause of 
such segregation.134 
Under the privisions of the Emergency School Aid Act, 
school districts attempting to desegregate their schools 
were eligible for Federal financial assistance. 
132civj.i Rights Act of 1964, Pub L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 
252 (1965) 
!33ibid. 
134Education Amendments of 1972 P.L. 92-318. 86 Stat 
354 (1973). 
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The grants could be used for a variety of school adminis­
tration endeavors such as staff training, hiring, and com­
munity relations. 
However, Title VIII of the same Emergency School Aid 
Act provided a prohibition against assignment or transpor­
tation of students to overcome racial imbalance. Section 
801 of the Act states, "No provision of this Act shall 
be constred to require the assignment or transportation 
of students or teachers in order to overcome racial imbal­
ance". ̂35 Section 802 (a) of Title VIII entitled, "Prohi­
bition Against Use of Appropriated Funds for Busing"; clearly 
states that no funds appropriated for the purpose of carrying 
out any applicable program may be used for busing to overcome 
racial imbalance in any school or school system.136 
Section 215 (a) (Title II) of the Education Amendments 
of 1974 (P.L. 93-380) states: 
No court, department or agency of the United 
States shall, pursuant to Section 214, order 
the implementation of a plan that would require 
the transportation of any student to a school 
other than the school closest or next closest 
to his place of residence which provides the 
appropriate grade level and type of education 
for such students.137 
135];bid. , p. 371. 
136ibid. 
137fhe Education Amendments of 1974, Pub L. 93-380 
88 Stat 517 (1976). 
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Title II of the same Education Amendment, Subpart 
2 - states in Section 204 that the denial of equal educational 
opportunity is prohibited, while Section 205 states that 
racial balance is not required and that it does not constitute 
a denial of equal educational opportunity.138 
Section 205 of the same Amendment states that assignment 
on a neighborhood basis is not a denial of equal educational 
opportunity.139 jn the more recent public laws, the thrust 
has been to curb mandatory busing as the main requirement 
for the implementation of school integration. It seems 
likely that public officials are acting on behalf of the 
populace whom they represent. 
While Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act authorized 
the termination of federal funding for failure to comply 
with its requirements, the Byrd amendment to the Labor-HEW 
Appropriation Acts of the 1970's (P.L. 94-206 and P.L. 
94-439) prohibited the use of appropriated funds to require, 
directly or indirectly, the busing of students to any school 
other than the one nearest their home. Congress was indeed 
taking a reverse position on the issue of busing for school 
integration.140 
138ibid., p. 515 
139jbid. 
140gtedman, p. 9. 
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Legislative Activities of the ,97th. Congress 
The issue of school busing for desegregation was a 
prominent topic during the 97th Congress in both the Senate 
and the House of Representatives. A selection of the bills 
and resolutions which were introduced in the 97th Congress 
is presented below to illustrate the impact the issue had 
on public officials. 
H. R. 869 (Crane ) 
A bill to limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
and of the district courts in certain cases. This bill 
would amend the United States Code to prevent the Supreme 
Court from having review jurisdiction on any case which 
relates to assignment of a student to a public school on 
the basis of race, creed, color, or sex; to the Committee 
on the Judiciary.141 
H. R. 761 (McDonald) 
A bill to insure the equal protection of the laws 
and to protect the liberty of the citizens as guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment, by eliminating Federal court 
jurisdiction over forced school attendance; to the Committee 
on the Judiciary.1^2 
141h. Res. 869, 97th Cong. 1st. sess., 16 January 
1981, Congressional Record, p. H116. 
Res. 761, 97th Cong. 1st. sess., 6 January 1981, 
Congressional Record, p. H73. 
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H. J. R. 91 (Volkmer) 
A joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Con­
stitution of the United States prohibiting Federal courts 
from entering orders requiring the attendance of any student 
at a particular school; to the Committee on the Judiciary.143 
S. 528 (Johnston, Laxalt,. Thurmond, 
Hollings, DeConcini, Exon and McClure) 
A bill (Neighborhood School Act of 1981) to establish 
limits on the power of courts of the United States in the 
imposition of injuctive relief in suits to protect the 
constitutional rights of individuals in public education 
and to authorize the Attorney General to institute suits 
to enforce such limits; to the Committee on the Judiciary.144 
S. 1005 (Helms) 
A bill (Student Freedom of Choice Act) to amend the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title XII) to provide for freedom 
of choice in student assignment in public schools; to the 
committee on the Judiciary. Upon enactment, this bill 
would provide that no department, agency, office or employee 
of the United States empowered to extend Federal financial 
assistance . . . shall withhold, or threaten to withhold, 
any such Federal Assistance . . . (1) on account of the 
143h. J. Res. 91, 97th Cong. 1st sess.. 19 January 
1981, Congressional Record, p. H130. 
144s. 528, 97th Cong. 1st sess. 24 February 1981, 
Congressional Record, p. S1481 
78 
racial composition of the student body, or (2) to coerce or 
induce the school board operating such public school to 
ransport students or (3) to coerce or induce any school 
board to close any public school, or (4) to coerce or induce 
any school board to transfer any member of any public school 
faculty.145 
145s. 1005, 97th Cong. 1st sess. 27 April 1981, Congress­
ional Record, p. S3955. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF BUSING FOR DESEGREGATION IN DE 
FACTO SEGREGATED SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
Introduction 
After 1971, the Swann decision mandated country­
wide racial quotas by busing,-if necessary, requiring 
all schools to eliminate de jure segregation. The legal 
battle then transferred to non-Southern school districts 
where the issue was de facto segregation. Proof of dis­
crimination was far more difficult to assess, because the 
absence of state-imposed segregation laws confounded the 
plaintiffs' attorneys who often argued proof of segregative 
intent on behalf of school boards in additition to the 
actual segregation. 
School desegregation and racial balances were partic­
ularity difficult to accomplish in metropoliton school 
districts because of the continuous exodus of white pupils. 
Table 15 represents changes in racial percentages of pupils 
over an eight-year period in twelve of the largest 
non-Southern school districts.^ The percentages are shown 
rather than the actual numerical figures. For example, 
^Adam Yarmolinsky, Lance Liebman, and Corine S. Schelling 
ed. Race and Schooling in the City, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1981), pp. 18-19. 
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in 1968, Los Angeles had 653,549 total students; 350,909 
(or 53.7 percent) were white students and 302,640 (or 46.3 
percent) were "minorities", i.e., Black, Asian, Hispanic, 
etc. In 1976, the total student count was 592,931 or 219,359, 
37.0 percent, white pupils and 373,572 or 63.0 percent, 
"minorities". The white pupil loss was 131,550 or 37.5 
percent of the 1968 white student count. The total loss 
of students from 1968 to 1976 was only 60,618 or just 9.3. 
The term "loss" of white pupils should be interpreted as 
"moving from the large inter-city school districts into 
surrounding smaller school districts and/or into private 
schools. 
An authentic obstacle to a feasible desegregation 
policy has been the heavy concentration of black pupils 
in segregated areas within central cities, such as the 
city of Detroit, Michigan, where 53 smaller predominantly 
white school districts surround this one city.2 The percent­
age of blacks living in suburbs of central cities was lower 
in 1970 than in 1900.3 Although the number of blacks in 
the suburbs has increased fairly rapidly, the base from 
which they began was so small that they still constitute 
2Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
^Gary Orfield, Must We Bus? (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brooking Institution, 1978), p. 50. 
TABLE 15 
Racial Change in Non-Southern Urban Public Schools; 1968 to 1976 
City Year White(%) Minorities*-* (%) White Loss Total 
New York 1968 
1976 
43.9 
30.5 
56.1 
69.5 29.8 
Los Angeles 1968 
1976 
53.7 
37.0 
46.3 
63.0 37.50 9.3 
Chicago 1968 
1976 
37.7 
25.0 
62.3 
75.0 40.4 10.0 
Detroit 1968 
1976 
39.3 
18.7 
60.7 
81.3 61.6 19.2 
Philadelphia 1968 
1976 
38.7 
31.8 
61.3 
68.2 25.1 8.7 
St. Louis 1968 
1976 
36.5 
28.5 
63.5 
71.5 45.0 29.5 
Columbus, Ohio 1968 
1976 
73.8 
67.1 
26.2 
32.9 20.8 12.9 
Denver 1968 
1976 
65.6 
48.6 
34.4 
51.4 18.3 5.8 
Boston 1968 
1976 
68.0 
45.0 
31.5 
55.0 46.4 18.4 
San Francisco 1968 
1976 
41.2 
22.9 
58.8 
77.1 61.5 30.7 
Seatle 1968 
1976 
82.2 
67.3 
17.8 
32.7 46.1 34.3 
Cincinnati 1968 
1976 
56.7 
46.8 
43.3 
53.2 37.6 24.4 
^"Minorities include Blacks , Hispanics , Asians, and Native Americans 
Source: Race and Schooling in the City , pp. 18-19. 
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an insignificant fraction of suburban residents.4 
The legal process to desegregate the de facto segregated 
school districts began in several school systems at approx­
imately the same time. The Pontiac, Michigan school system 
became one of the first to be litigated in 1969. That year, 
the 1500-member Pontiac chapter of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People filed a class-action 
suit against the Pontiac school system on behalf of Mrs. 
Sadie Davis and her son Donald.5 The suit charged that 
the Pontiac schools were segregated in violation of the 
Brown I United States Supreme Court dicision of 1954, which 
held that segregated schools were inherently unequal.® 
Although the NAACP did not think the case could be 
won and therefore offered little support, the United States 
District Court ruled that the schools were segregated and 
ordered the school board to institute a busing system to 
achieve integration.? The United States Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals waited until the United States Supreme Court 
expressed its position on busing in Swann8 and then the Circuit 
4Ibid., p. 51. 
5William Serrin, "They Don't Burn Buses Anymore in 
Pontiac", Saturday Review 55 (24 June 1972): 8. 
6Ibid. 7Ibid. 
8Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 
403 U.S. 912 (1971) 
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Court upheld the busing order.9 Thus, even though Michigan 
was not a de jure segregation state, it was a state with 
de facto segregation and school litigation had arrived. 
De facto segregation and busing became inseparable 
issues. The decade of the seventies produced numerous 
cases concerning school segregation. However, unlike prior 
de jure in which the United States Supreme Court always 
decided with unanimity, de facto cases brought forth diverse 
opinions. Del facto segregation cases received a different 
constitutional review with each justice. For either political 
or personal reasons, the litigations received thorough exam­
inations. 
One of the most notable non-Supreme Court de facto 
segregation cases remains that of the Boston Morgan v. Hennigan 
school desegregation case. While Boston had always been 
characterized as a city of libertarianism, another image 
of the city became known during the early 1970's. 
Federal District Judge W. Arthur Garrity, Jr. explained 
that the Boston school desegregation issue was a clear vi­
olation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.10 
Judge Garity provided the following opinion in this case: 
^Serrin, p. 8. 
lOLeon Jones, From Brown to Boston, 2 Vols. (Metuchen, 
New Jersey: Scarecrow Press Inc., 1979), p. 18. 
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The Court concludes that the defendants have know­
ingly carried out a systematic program of seg­
regation affecting all of the city's students, 
teachers, and school facilities and have inten­
tionally brought about and maintained a dual school 
system. Therefore, the entire school system of 
Boston is unconstitutionally segregated.H 
"Boston was found by both the Federal District Court 
and the Circuit Court of Appeals to be as much of de jure 
school segregation as in any school district in the South," 
according to Author Leon Jones.12 
In attempting to alleviate overcrowding at white Cleveland 
Junior High School, the Boston School Committee had chosen 
not to assign students to the closer and underutilized black 
schools, but rather to crowd further already overutilized 
South Boston High.13 Deputy Superintendent of Schools Thomas 
Meagler testified that assigning white students to black 
schools to alleviate overcrowding was not considered because 
white parents would protest.14 The violent reaction to 
the decision has raised the question whether the law will 
withstand the pressure to turn away from the national com­
mitment to an integrated society.I5 
Hlbid. 
12ibid. 
l^Roger I. Abrams, "Not One Judge's Opinion: Morgan 
v. Hennigan and the Boston Schools", Harvard Educational 
Review 45 (February 1975). 
l^ibid. l^ibid., p. 6. 
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Intent to Segregate 
After Swann, two years passed before the United States 
Supreme Court returned with the decision in Keyes which 
became the first de facto segregation case. 
The significance of the Keyes decision was that the 
United States Supreme Court extended the definition of de 
jure segregation to include systems intentionally segre­
gating even if not by state statute. 
In Keyes, the petitioners first sought desegregation 
of the Park Hill area schools in Denver; then, after the 
District Court ordered desegregation in these schools, the 
petitioners expanded the suit to secure desegregation of 
the remaining schools in the Denver school district. 
The District Court denied the additional relief sought by 
the petitioners by proclaiming that the deliberate racial 
segregation of the Park Hill schools was not proof enough 
that a similar segregation policy addressed specifically 
to the core city schools existed and demanded that the pet­
itioners prove de jure segregation existed for each area 
that they sought to desegregate. 
The District Court found that the "white" schools in 
other parts of the district were superior to the segregated 
core city schools and relied on Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
l^Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 
413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
86 
U.S. 537, to order the school district to provide substan­
tially equal facilities for the core city schools. This 
latter relief was reversed by the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals even though that court affirmed that, although the 
Park Hill schools were deliberately segregated, there was 
no overall school board activity that established a policy 
of system-wide segregation. 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court modified 
and remaned the case. Justice William Brennan delivered 
the opinion of the Court, in which Justices William Douglas, 
Potter Stewart, Thurgood Marshall, and Harry Blackmun joined. 
Justice William Douglas filed a separate opinion. Chief 
Justice Warren Burger- concurred in the results. Justice 
Lewis Powell concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice 
William Rehnquist dissented. Justice Byron White did not 
take part in the decision. 
Justice William Brennan conceded that this Denver case 
did not meet the "segregation by stature" as was decided 
upon in Brown I, Brown II, and Swann; then he added: 
Nevertheless, where plaintiffs prove that the 
school authorities have carried out a systematic 
program of segregation, . . . it is only common 
sense to conclude that there exists a predicate 
for a finding of the existence of a dual school 
system. 
Justice Brennan insisted that the District Court had 
erred in not placing Negroes and Hispanics in the same cate­
gory for the purposes of defining a "segregated" core city 
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school. Both groups suffered the same educational inequities 
when compared with the treatment afforded Anglo students.^ 
Justice Brannan acknowledged that: 
Denver is a tri-ethnic, and distinguished from 
a biracial, community. The overall racial and 
ethnic composition of the Denver public schools 
is 66% Anglo, 14% Negro, and 20% Hispano. The 
District Court, in assessing the question of de 
jure segregation in the core city schools, pre­
liminarily resolved that Negroes and Hispanos 
should not be placed in the same category to es­
tablish the segregated character of a school (313 
F. Supp. at 69). Later in determining the schools 
that were likely to produce an inferior educational 
opportunity, the court concluded that a school 
would be considered inferior only if it had "a 
concentration of either Negro or Hispano students 
in the general area of 70% to 75%! (Id., at 77(. 
Concerning the concept of racial percentages, Justice 
Brennan insisted that: 
We intimate not opinion whether the District Court 
used t'-.ose figures to singify educationally inferior 
schools and there is not suggestion in the record 
that those same figures were or would be used 
to define a 'segregated' school in the de jure 
context. What is or is not a segregated school 
will necessarily depend on the facts of each particular 
case. In addition to the racial and ethnic compo­
sition of a school's student body, other factors, 
such as the racial and ethnic composition of faculty 
and staff and the community and administration 
attitudes toward the school, must be taken into 
consideration. The District Court has recognized 
these specific factors as elements of a 'segregated' 
school (id., at 74), and we may, therefore, infer 
that the Court will consider them on remand. 
We conclude, however that the District Court 
erred in separating Negroes and Hispanos for purposes 
l^ibid. 
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of defining a "Segregated" school. We have held 
that Hispanos constitute an identifiable class 
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hermandez 
v. Texas 347 U.S. 475, 98 L Ed 866, 74 S Ct 667 
(1954). 
Moreover, Justice Brennan pointed out that the "lower 
courts applied an incorrect legal standard" concerningthe 
petitioners' contention that the Denver School Board had 
adopted a policy of deliberately segreating the core city 
schools. Continuing, Justice Brennan maintained, "Our con­
clusion is that those courts did not apply the current stan­
dard in addressing that contention". He further observed: 
Indeed, the District Court found that between 
1960 and 1969 the Board's policies with respect 
to these Northeast Denver schools show an undev-
iating purpose to isolate Negro students in segregated 
schools "while preserving the Anglo character 
of other schools".18 
Justice Brennan had initially pointed out in the written 
opinion that the Colorado Constitution prohibited "clas­
sification of pupils ... on account of race or color".19 
But the Justice stated further in his opinion: 
This finding did not relate to an insubstantial 
or trivial fragment of the school system. On 
the contrary, respondent School Board was found 
guilty- of following a deliberate segregation policy 
of schools attended, in 1969, by 37.69% of Denver's 
total Negro school population, including one-fourth 
of the Negro elementary pupils, over two-thirds 
of the Negro Junior high pupils, and over two-fifths 
of the Negro high school pupils. 
ISlbid. 
^Colorado, Constitution, art. IX, sec. 8. 
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. . . Respondent argues, however, that a finding 
of state-imposed segregation as to a substantial 
portion of the school system can be viewed in 
isolation from the rest of the district, and even 
if a state-imposed segregation does exist in a 
substantial part of the Denver School System, 
it does not follow that the District Court could 
predicate on that fact a finding that the entire 
school system in a dual system. We do not agree. 
The third major point to be noted by Justice Brennan 
that a policy of intentional segregation had been proven 
with respect to a significant portion of the school system. 
To remedy the problem of intentional segregation Justice 
Brennan maintained that: 
. . . The burden is on the school authorities 
[regardless of claims that their 'neighborhood 
school policy' was racially neutral] to prove 
that their actions as to other segregated schools 
in the system were not likewise motivated by a 
segregation intent. 
On remand, Justice Brennan directed the District Court 
to provide the school board an opportunity to establish 
that the Park Hill area was a separate, identifiable, and 
unrelated section of the school district. If the Denver 
School Board failed, then the District Court must determine 
whether the school board policy mandated deliberate segrega­
tion in the Park Hill Schools. He pointed out once again 
that the school board had the affirmative duty to desegregate 
the entire school system if the District Court determined 
that it was a dual system. If the entire school system 
was not a dual system, then the District Court must allow 
the school board the opportunity to rebut petitioners prima 
facie case of intentional segregation. The school board 
would have to show that policies and practices concerning 
school sites, school size, school renovations and additions, 
student attendance zones, student assignments and transfers, 
mobil classroom units, transportation of students, and as­
signment of faculty and staff did not create or maintain 
segregation in the core city schools. If the school board 
failed to rebut petitioners' prima facie case, then the 
District Court would decree all-out desegregation of the 
core city schools. 
Finally, Justice Brannan would not dismiss the argument 
that the school authorities had been bound not to produce 
de jure segregation by the manipulation of the neighborhood 
school issue "simply because it appears to be neutral".20 
School systems thoughout the nation were disappointed 
that the Keyes decision did not decide the neighborhood 
school questions.21 However, Justice Brennan clearly made 
the point that school boards carried the burden of proof 
that school segregation was not a result of intentional 
board actions. 
Although Justice William Douglas concurred with the 
majority opinion, he went along with Justice Powell and 
20Reyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189. 
21James Bolner, Busing: The Political and Judicial 
Process (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 36. 
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for the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment, that there was no difference between de 
facto and de jure segregation.22 
Justice Douglas wrote in his opinion: 
The school board is a state agency and the lines 
that it draws, the location it selects for school 
sites, the allocation it makes of students, the 
budgets if prepares are state action for Fourteenth 
Amendment purposes. 
. . .  I  t h i n k  i t  i s  t i m e  t o  s t a t e  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  
no constitutional difference between de jure and 
de facto segregation, for each is the product 
of state actions or policies. If a 'neighborhood' 
or 'geographical' unit has been created along 
racial lines by reason of the play of restrictive, 
covenants that restrict certain areas to "the 
elite', leaving the 'undesirables' to move elsewhere, 
there is state action in the constitutional sense 
because the force of law is placed behind those 
convenants. 
There is state action in the constitutional sense 
when public funds are dispersed by urban development 
agencies to build racial ghettos.23 
Justice Lewis Powell maintained that a state is barred 
from creating by any device, including mandated pupil assign­
ment plans, human ghettoes.24 as already pointed out, Justice 
Powell agreed with Justice Douglas that there should be 
no distinction between de facto and de jure segregated school 
systems. Moreover, Justice Powell insisted that the distinc­
tion should be abolished in favor of a single constitutional 
22ibid., p. 567 
23Reyes, p. 189 ff. 
24ifc>id. 
92 
rule requiring genuinely integrated school systems. Finally, 
Justice Powell maintained that: 
There is segregation in the schools of many of these 
cities fully as pervasive as that in southern cities 
prior to the desegregation decrees of the past decade 
and a half. 
. . .  W e  m u s t  r e c o g n i z e  t h a t  t h e  e v i l  o f  o p e r a t i n g  
separate schools is no less in Denver than in Atlanta.26 
Justice William Rehnquist's dissenting opinion suggested 
that the doctrine of compulsory integration deviated from 
the established doctrine in Brown I and Brown II. Continuing, 
Justice Rehnquist maintained that: 
Underlying the Court's entire opinion is its apparent 
thesis that a district judge is at least permitted 
to find if a single attendance zone between two 
individual schools in the large metropolitan dis­
trict is found by him to have been 'gerrymandered', 
the school district is guilty of operating a 'dual' 
school system, and is apparently a candidate for 
what is in practice a federal receivership.27 
From the 1954 Brown I to the 1971 Swann, in every de 
jure desegregation cases the Supreme Court presented a unified 
opinion. Beginning with Keyes in 1973, the Supreme Court 
was to be divided with de facto cases. Keyes was the beginning 
of landmark Supreme Court school desegregation cases in 
which the justices would develop both legal and social phi­
losophies on both sides of the issue. 
25Americo D. Lapati, Education and the. Federal Government: 
A Historical Record (New York: Mason/Charger, 1975), p. 
302. 
26Keyes v. School District No. 1 413 U.S. 189 ff. 
27Ibid. 
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Rejection of Multi-District Remedy 
In 1971, a suit was filed in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against certain 
state officials and the Board of Education of the city of 
Detroit, seeking desegregation of Detroit public schools. 
The District Court concluded that the defendants had engaged 
in unconstitutional activities for which the state was 
responsible and that these unconstitutional activities resulted 
in de jure segregation in the city school district. There­
fore, the District Court ordered the submission of desegre­
gation plans for the city alone, and for the three-county 
metropolitan area, even though the suburban school districts 
had no relationship to the Detroit School System and other­
wise had not committed any constitutional violations.28 
The District Court later insisted that the proposed 
"Detroit-only" plans were inadequate, and desegregation 
plans limited only to the city schools would not produce 
a racial balance reflecting the racial composition of the 
entire metropolitan area; moreover, such plans would only 
accentuate the racial identification of the city school 
system where some of the schools would be up to 90 percent 
black.29 
28Milliken v. Bradley 418 U.S. 717, 41 L Ed 2d 1069, 
94 S Ct. 3112. (1974). 
29lbid. 
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The District Court developed a metropolitan plan that 
included the fifty-three suburban school districts plus 
Detroit. Finally, the District Court demanded that a spec­
ified number of school buses be obtained to provide intersystem 
transportation under an interim plan which was to be developed 
for the coming year.30 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that part 
of the finding opinion concerning de jure segregation in 
the Detroit School District and the need of a metropolitan 
desegregation plan; however, it remanded for joinder as 
parties to the case, all suburban districts that might be 
affected by any metropolitan plan. The District Court's 
order for the acquisition of school buses was vacated 
On certiorari, July 25, 1974, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded the case for the development 
of a plan restricted to the city of Detroit. Chief Justice 
Warren Burger delivered the Court's opinion with Justices 
Stewart, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist concurring. Justice 
Douglas filed a dissenting separate opinion of desent. 
Justice White filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices 
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall joined. 
The lower courts had found that the Detroit School 
Board, much like the Denver School Board, had adopted or 
30ibid. 
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sanctioned policies that intensified segregation.31 This 
Milliken case, according to Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, 
presented the same fundamental question that the Court had 
faced in the Richmond, Virginia case: Could a federal judge 
order interdistrict school desegregation?^ 
Chief Justice Warren Burger in writing the Courts maj­
ority opinion held that: 
1. In the exercise of its equity powers in a school 
case, a federal court could not properly impose 
a multidistrict, areawide remedy to a single dis­
trict de jure segregation problem unless it was 
first established that unconstitutional racially 
discriminatory acts of other districts had caused 
interdistrict segregation, or that lines which 
could not be considered as mere arbitrary lines 
drawn for political convenience had been deli­
berately drawn on the basis of race. 
2. Thus, the remedy in the case at bar must be limited 
to the Detroit School District even though desegre­
gation of only the city schools would not reflect 
the racial composition of the metropolitan areas 
as a whole, because: 
a) The record established de jure segregation 
in the city schools only, and did not estab­
lish any significant constitutional violations 
by the 53 suburban school districts or any 
significant interdistrict violation producing 
an interdistrict segregative effect. 
b) A metropolitan remedy might seriously disrupt 
the state's structure of public education in­
volving a large measure of local control, and 
would aive rise to many problems as to large-
31]Richard Kluger, Simple Justice, (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1977), p. 771. 
32g0k Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), p. 283. 
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scale busing of students, financing, and admin­
istration. 33 
Justice Potter Stewart filed a concurring opinion in 
Milliken maintaining that unconstitutional racial segrega­
tion was found only within Detroit in this case. Therefore, 
the plans could not properly include other school districts 
where there was no showing of unlawful segregation. 
Justice Stewart concluded his opinion with the fol­
lowing statement: 
. . .  B y  a p p r o v i n g  a  r e m e d y  t h a t  w o u l d  r e a c h  b e y o n d  
the limits of the city of Detroit to correct a 
constitutional violation found to have occurred 
solely within that city, the Court of Appeals 
thus went beyond the governing equitable principles 
established in this Court's decision.34 
Justice William Douglas dissented from the majority 
opinion by stating that the Court of Appeals had acted res­
ponsibly and that metropolitan treatment of metropolitan 
problems is commonplace. Justice Douglas insisted that 
if the case had involved a metropolitan water, sewage, or 
energy problem, the state of Michigan would be within federally 
constitutional bounds to seek a metropolitan remedy. There 
were two additional elements to Justice Douglas' dissenting 
opinion. 
33Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 41 L Ed 2d 1069, 
S. Ct. 3112. 
34ifc>id. 
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1. In view of the obligation of school districts to 
pay their own way, the Court's ruling against a 
metropolitan remedy meant that there could be no 
violation of the equal protection clause even 
though schools were segregated by race and black 
schools were not only 'separate' but also 'inferior'. 
2. There was no difference between de facto and de 
jure segregation, and that the creation of school 
districts in metropolitan Detroit either maintained 
existing segregation or caused additional segrega­
tion. 35 
Justice Douglas pointed out that, given the San Antonio 
School district, v. Rodriguez decision, the poor were not 
only required to pay their way, but also were allowed to 
attend not only "separate" but "inferior" schools. 'Finally, 
Justice Douglas insisted that the decision was a dramatic 
retreat from the 7-to-l decision in 1896 that blacks could 
be segregated in public facilities, but that they had to 
receive equal treatment. 
Justice Byron White, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, 
and Marshall, wrote the following: 
1. Under the Court's holding, deliberate acts of segre­
gation and their consequences would go unremedied, 
not because a remedy would be infeasible or unrea­
sonable in terms of the usual criteria governing 
school desegregation cases, but because an effec­
tive remedy would cause what the court considered 
to be undue administrative inconvenience to the 
state, but the Court did not challenge the District 
Court's conclusion that a plan including the 
suburbs would be physically easier and more practical 
than a Detroit-only plan. 
2. The constitutional violations, even if occurring 
locally, were committed by governmental entities 
for which the state was responsible. 
3. The federal courts should be free to devise workable 
remedies, an interdistrict remedy being necessary 
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in the case at bar, and there being no acceptable 
reason for permitting the state, as the responsible 
party to restrict the federal court's remedial 
powers. 
Finally, a disappointed Justice Marshall offered a 
passionate dissenting conclusion: 
Desegregation is not and was never expected to 
be an easy task. Racial attitudes ingrained in 
our nation's childhood and adolescence are not 
quickly thrown aside in its middle years. But, 
just as the inconvenience of some cannot be allowed 
to stand in the way of the rights of others, or 
public opposition, no matter how strident, cannot 
be permitted to divert this court from the enforcement 
of the constitutional principles at issue in this 
case. Today's holding, I fear, is more a reflection 
of a perceived public mood that we have gone far 
enough in enforcing the Constitution's guarantee 
of equal justice than it is the product of neutral 
principles of law. In the short run, it may seem 
to be the easier course to allow our great metro­
politan areas to be divided up each into two cities 
one white, the other black but it is a course, 
I predict, our people will ultimately regret. 
I dissent. 
The Supreme Court had dealt difinitively for the first 
time in Milliken with de facto segregation by housing patterns 
and economic conditions. The four holdovers from the Warren 
Court voted in the minority and to these four justices, 
the decision represented a major retreat in school desegre­
gation decisions. 
The Detroit case was considered a landmark case.in 
that the United States Supreme Court had, in a 5-4 vote, 
placed a damper on court-ordered busing. The Richmond case 
S^Kluger, p. 773. 
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had been considered a case comparable to Milliken but because 
Justice Powell had served on Virginia school boards for 
a number of years, he refused to take part in the case. 
Thus, the 4-to-4 deadlock in the Richmond case had not left 
lower courts with any law of the subject.36 
The Richmond Times-Dispatch printed the following 
comments on July 26, 1974, the day after the Milliken deci­
sion : 
Yesterday's decision has the gratifying impact 
locally of removing the last shred of uncertainity 
surrounding the Richmond School Board's effort 
to consolidate city schools with those of Henrico 
and Chesterfield counties for the purpose of seeking 
a white majority in every school. Consolidation 
is dead. All the area school systems are indepen­
dently operating on a racially-unitary basis. 
Some schools will continue to be heavily black 
but that does not mean that such schools ought 
to be regarded as inferior. Local officials and 
citizens ought now to shift from their preoccupation 
with race to a whole-hearted concentration on 
teaching children, wherever they are, the skills 
they need to survive and preferably to excel in 
a complex age. 
The Richmond, Virginia school desegregation case had 
first begun in 1961 and the current phase of the case began 
on March 10, 1970. The black plaintiffs filed a motion 
for further relief. The United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division, ordered 
36Woodward and Armstrong, p. 266. 
37Judith F. Buncher, ed., The School Busing Controversy; 
1970-75 (New York: Facts on File, 1975), p. 79. 
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the integration of schools in the city with those of Herico 
and Chesterfield counties.38 
The Court of Appeals, with Circuit Judge Braxton Craven 
writing the opinion, held that when state-imposed segregation 
had been removed intervention by the District Court was 
neither necessary nor justifiable. This case which began 
as Bradley v. School Board of the. City of Richmond, had 
now become broadened to include the school boards of both 
Henrico and Chesterfield Counties. Judge Craven's opinion 
stated that District Court Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr. 
did not have the authority to order consolidation of such 
separate political subdivisions of the commonwealth. 
Upon reaching the Supreme Court city-suburban busing 
was struck down with a 4-to-4 vote deadlock. Justice Lewis 
Powell did not take part because of his 19 years of service 
on school boards. 
The Detroit decision, along with the Richmond decision 
left little doubt as to the philosophy of the United States 
Supreme Court toward school desegregation when there is 
absence of proven de jure segregation. The distinction 
between simpe de facto segregation and segregative intent 
had become a critical issue to the legal purists serving 
on the United States Supreme Court. But to the more liberal 
^Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 
412 U.S. 92 (1973) . 
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justices and to Justice Marshall in particular, the Detroit 
and Richmond cases as with most school desegregation cases, 
were of greater significance than the concept of fine tech­
nicalities . 
Acceptance of Interdistrict. ..Remedy 
In contrast to the Detroit and Richmond cases, a Del­
aware case in which de jure segregation was confirmed resulted 
in the acceptance of interdistrict remedy. The United States 
Supreme Court ruled on Buchanan v. Evans on November 19, 
1975 and affirmed the District Court's decision which re­
quired interdistrict busing in a 6-to-3 vote.39 The'Supreme 
Court had found the suburban districts of the Detroit areas 
not to have been party to any segregative policies or prac­
tices which constituted a case of de facto segregation. 
However, in this Delaware case, the District Court had de­
termined that the city of Wilmington and the entire state 
of Delaware were involved in segregative policies because 
Wilmington was excluded in a statewide school-district con­
solidation effort. This action was to constitute de jure 
segregation. It should be noted that Delaware had once 
been a de jure segregated state and had been one of the 
four states involved in Brown I. The state legislature 
had pased an Educational Advancement Act in June 1968 which 
^Buchanan v. Evans, 423 U.S. 963 (1975). 
102 
was to provide the framework for an effective and orderly 
reorganization of existing school districts and the combin­
ation of other existing school districts. The state statute 
read that the district of Wilmington should be "the city 
of Wilmington with the territory within its limits".4® 
The District Court contended that this exception for 
the city of Wilmington discriminated against blacks.4^ 
Therefore, a three-judge District Court declared that the 
portion of the Educational Advancement Act which excluded 
Wilmington from consideration for consolidation was uncon­
stitutional and requested a desegregation plan to include 
Wilmington and other areas of New Castle county.42 Moreover, 
the District Court enjoined the State Board from relying 
on the Educational Advancement Act in the drafting of plans. 
The case was appealed directly from the District Courts 
to the United States Supreme Court. The United States Court 
affirmed the District Court's ruling. Justices Powell, 
Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger dissented with Justice 
Rehnquist writing the dissenting opinion.43 The dissenting 
argument stated that the enjoining of the enforcement of 
4Qpelaware Code Annotated, Title 14, Section 1001 (1975). 
4lBuchanan v. Evans, 423 U.S. 963 (1975) 
42ibid. 
43Ibid. 
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the state stature was not an issue in the Milliken case on 
which the Supreme Court based this case and that the District 
Court could not enjoin the implementation of a stature which 
had expired on July 1, 1969.44 
The case was returned to the District Court, where 
it was ruled that an interdistrict remedy was necessary in 
order to desegregate the Wilmington schools. The District 
Court then requested plans to be drawn to this effect. 
The District Court did not accept the argument that the 
suburban districts operated a unitary system and, in turn, 
were not committing any constitutional violation as was 
the issue in Milliken.The District Court ruled that 
local school boards were created by the state and the state 
through de jure segregation caused racial disparity. 
When none of the proposed plans were found acceptable 
to the District Court, a representative board from existing 
boards was charged with the task of designing an acceptable 
plan. A consolidated school district of eighty thousand 
students was thereby created because of past state-supported 
acts of de jure segregation. 
The Wilmington Board of Education then appealed the 
case to the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. 
The Court of Appeals sitting en blanc modified and affirmed 
44Ibid. 
45Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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the District Court's ruling in a 4-to-3 vote.46 
The Court of Appeals held: 
1. The Supreme Court's summary affirmance of the Dis­
trict Court's 1975 order would appear to be binding 
on this court under the law of the case principle. 
2. The reviewing court (Court of Appeals) defers to 
a trial court's exercise of remedial discretion 
when it has applied proper legal precepts and re­
mained within determined legal boundaries. 
3. The fashioning of an interdistrict remedy was not . 
abuse of discretion. 
4. That although no definitive racial quota was intended, 
the 10-35% enrollment criterion was expressly dis­
approved. 47 
In this comparison case, the United States Supreme 
Court gave split-vote approval to interdistrict consolida­
tion for the purpose of school integration when de jure 
segregation had been established. 
Annual Readjustments to Prevent Minority-
Majority Schools Overruled 
The argument of unconstitutional segregation was given 
a new impetus in the Pasadena v. Spangler case in 1968 with 
the consideration of evolving demographic trends. After 
several high school students and their parents brought a 
purported class action against school officials seeking 
judicial relief from allegedly unconstitutional segregation 
in the schools in Pasadena, California, the United States 
46Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F 2d 373 (1977). 
47Ibid. 
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government intervened as an additional plaintiff on the 
basis of Section 902 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
This portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 stipulates 
that upon intervention the United States shall be entitled 
to the same relief as if it had instituted the action. 
In 1970, the District Court held that the defendants' 
educational policies and practices violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The same court enjoined the school board from 
failing to adopt a desegregation plan and ordered the school 
board to submit a plan for desegregating the Pasadena schools 
which would provide that, beginning with the 1970-1971 school 
year, no school would have a majority of minority students. 
The District Court also retained the jurisdiction to see 
that the plan was implemented. 
The defendant school board members submitted the 
"Pasadena Plan", which was accepted by the District Court, 
but the succeeding school board members filed a motion with 
the District Court in 1974. They sought to have the 1970 
order modified by having the injunction dissolved and by 
having the District Court's jurisdiction terminated. 
The motion was denied by the District Court on the 
basis that the school board allegedly had not complied with 
the 1970 order and that "literal" compliance with the "no 
majority" requirement and that the requirement was inflex-
48pasadena city Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 
U.S. 424 (1976). 
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ible and was to be applied anew annually even though the 
school board might not consider itself responsible for 
such factors as population shifts. 
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
District Court's opinion was affirmed, but with reservation, 
which the Court of Appeals felt the District Court would 
heed. 
Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme 
Court in order to answer the issue of a District Court exceeding 
its decision on June 28 of the same year. Justice William 
Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion of the Court in 
which he was joined by Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun 
and Powell in addition to Chief Justice Burger. Justice 
Thurgood Marshall filed a dissenting opinion in the case 
in which Justice Brennan joined. Justice Stevens did not 
participate in either the consideration or decision.49 
The Supreme Court's majority opinion held that: 
1. The United States' presence in the case pursuant 
to Section 902 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 ensures that the case is not moot, although 
it is moot as to respondent students and parents 
who were the original named plaintiffs because 
these students have graduated from the school 
system and thus they and their parents no 
longer have any stake in the outcome of the 
litigation, and there has been no certification 
of a class of unnamed students still attending 
the Pasadena public schools. 
2. Having adopted the "Pasadena Plan" in 1970 
as establishing a racially neutral system 
49Ibid. 
of student assignment in the school system, 
the District Court exceeded its authority 
in enforcing its order so as to require annual 
readjustment of attendance zones so that there 
would not be a majority of any minority in 
any Pasadena public school. 
a) Since the post-1971 shifts in the racial 
make-up of some of the schools resulted 
from changes in the demographics of Pasa­
dena's residential pattern due to a normal 
pattern of people moving into, out of, 
and around the school system, and were 
not attributable to any segregative action 
on their part, neither the school officials 
nor the District Court was 'constitutionally 
required to make year-by-year adjustments 
of the racial composition of student bodies 
once the affirmative duty to desegregate 
has been accomplished and racial discrimina­
tion through official action is eliminated 
from the system'. 
Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 32. 
b) The fact that even if the 'no majority' 
requirement had been unambiguous it would 
be contrary to the decision in Swann, Supra, 
and that, being ambiguous, the parties 
interpreted it in a manner contrary to 
the District Court's ultimate interpreta­
tion are factors, which, taken together, 
support modification of the 1970 decree. 
c) The Court of Appeals' disapproval of the 
District Court's view that it had a lifetime 
commitment to the 'no majority' requirement, 
and of the substance of that requirement, 
was not sufficient to remove the requirement 
from the case, since even though the Court 
of Appeals assumed that the District Court 
would heed such disapproval or remand, 
the fact remains that despite such disapproval 
the Court of Appeals affirmed the District 
Court's denial of the motion to amend the 
1970 order, and thus subjected petitioners 
to contempt for violation of the injunctive 
decree. Notwithstanding that they might 
have reasonable and proper objections to 
the decree. On this phase of the case 
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petitioners were entitled to reversal of 
the District Court with respect to its 
treatment of the 'no majority' requirement 
portion of the 1970 order.50 
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case as 
its majority vote established that once a school board had 
implemented an attendance plan that was racially neutral, 
then the school board is not constitutionally required to 
annually adjust student assignments in order to maintain 
a specific racial balance in the student body of each school. 
Justice William Rehnquist wrote that the normal pattern 
of human migration had resulted in changes in Pasadena's 
residential patterns and that these shifts were not attributed 
to any segregative actions on the part of the petitioners. 
Moreover, Justice Rehnquist stated that a similar situation 
was foreseen in Swann and he offered the precise citation 
to support the Court's contention in this c a s e .52 
It does not follow that the communities served 
by (unitary) systems will remain demographically 
stable, for in a growing, mobile society, few 
will do so. Neither school authorities nor district 
courts are constitutionally required to make year-
by-year adjustments of the racial composition 
of student bodies once the affirmative duty to 
desegregate has been accomplished and racial dis­
crimination through official actions is eliminated 
from the system.53 
SOibid., 427 
Sllbid., p. 436. 
52ibid. 
53swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971). 
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Finally, Justice Rehnquist wrote that because the case 
is to be returned to the Court of Appeals: 
The court will have an opportunity to reconsider 
its decision in light of our observations regarding 
the appropriate scope of equitable relief in this 
case. 
. . . Accordingly the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to 
that court for further proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion.54 
Justice Marshall wrote in his dissenting opinion, in 
which Justice Brennan joined, that official racial discrimina­
tion has not been eradicated from the school system; there­
fore, he could not agree with the Court's ruling that the 
District Court refusal to modify the "no majority of any 
minority" provision of its order was erroneous. 
Justice Marshall expressed that in his view, the 
ruling had unwarrantedly extended the Court's statement 
in Swann: 
Neither school authorities nor district courts 
are constitutionally required to make year-by-year 
adjustments of the racial compostion of student 
bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate 
has been accomplished and racial discrimjntion 
through official action is eliminated from the 
system. 55 
Justice Marshall asserted that in the Court's insisting 
upon the District Court to largely abandon its scrutiny 
of attendance patterns, the Court might be insuring that 
a unitary school system in Pasadena might never occur. 
54pasadena v. Spangler, pp. 440-441. 
55ibid., p. 424. 
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At least, according to Justice Marshall, segregation might 
never be eliminated "root and branch" as was required in 
Green v. Country School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968). 
In concluding his opinion, Justice Marshall saw the 
following points as the pertinent issue in the case: 
We have held that 'once a right and a violation have 
been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable 
powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth 
and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies'. 
Swann v. Board of Education. 
. . .  W e  s h o u l d  n o t  c o m p e l  t h e  D i s t r i c t  C o u r t  t o  m o d i f y  
its order unless conditions have changed so much that 
'dangers, once substantial, have become attenuated 
to a shadow'. United States v Swift and Company, 286 
U.S. 106, 119 (1932).36" 
The Court was not specific in stating racial ratio 
requirements in Pasadena as the case was remanded for further 
proceedings, but once again the Court was not unamimous 
in an important school desegregation cases. The lack of 
segregative intent on behalf of the school board proved 
more important in this case than the actual segregated housing 
pattern which resulted in the racial ratios in the schools. 
By the time of this Pasadena case, segregation by intent, 
on behalf of school boards or state agencies, had become 
the overriding factor as to how a majority of the United 
State Supreme Court Justices would vote in school desegregation 
cases. 
56ibid., p. 444. 
Ill 
District-Wide Busing Plan Upheld 
The significance of the Columbus case was that the 
Supreme Court upheld the district-wide busing plan. Fourteen 
students in the school system brought a class action against 
the Columbus Board of Education during 1973.57 The charge 
was that the Board pursued a policy that perpetuated racial 
segregation in the Columbus public schools in violation 
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.58 
In 1976, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio found that the pattern of segregation was 
the direct result of cognitive acts or omissions by school 
board members and administrators. The board had also been 
under obligation since 1954 to dismantle the dual school 
system and having failed to accomplish the task, the board 
actions and practices could not reasonably be explained 
without reference to racial concerns that it had intentionally 
aggravated racial isolation in the schools. 
The District Court concluded that the segregation in 
the Columbus School System was the direct result of the 
Board's segregated acts and omissions in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
57columbus Board of Education v Penick, 61 L Ed 2d 
666 (1979). 
58John L. Moore, ed., Historic Documents of 1979, 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1980), 
p. 536. 
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enjoined continuing discrimination of the basis of race 
and ordered submission of a system-wide desegregation plan. 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit United States Court of 
Appeals affirmed the District Court's ruling and held that 
the District Court had not misunderstood or misapplied the 
Fourteenth Amendment nor relevant cases contruing it. 
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed 
the United States Court of Appeals decision in a 7-2 vote 
in which Justice Byron White wrote an opinion that was joined 
by Justices brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Chief 
Justice Burger wrote a concurring opinion and Justice Potter 
Stewart wrote a separate concurring opinion in which Chief 
Justice Burger joined. Justice Lewis Powell wrote a dissenting 
opinion; Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate dissenting opinion 
in which Justice Powell joined.59 
Justice White insisted that because the school had 
been segregated at the time of Brown I, the school board 
had an affirmative constitutional responsibility to end 
that segregation.60 The Justice stated that the Columbus 
public schools of 96,000 students were highly segregated 
with 70% of all students attending schools at least 80% 
black or 80% white (429 F. Supp. 229, 240, SD Ohio 1977) 
and that half of the 172 schools were 90% black or 90% white, 
S^Columbus Board of Education v Penick 61 L Ed 2d 666 
(1979). 
60Moore, p. 536. 
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583 F 2d 787, 800 (CA6 1978). 
Justice White referred to Swann in determining whether 
a dual school system had been disestablished: 
Where it is possible to identify a 'white school' 
or a 'Negro school' simply by reference to the 
racial composition of teacher and staff, the quality 
of school buildings and equipment, or the organization 
of sports activities, a prima facia case of violation 
of substantive constitutional rights under the 
Equal Protection Clause is shown°^ 
In reference to student assignments, Justice White 
emphasized that the Court had said in Swann: 
No per se rule can adequately embrace all the 
difficulties of reconciling the competing interests 
involved; but in a system with a history of segrega­
tion the need for remedial criteria of sufficient 
specificity to assure a school authority's compliance 
with its constitutional duty warrants a presumption 
against schools that are substantially dispropor­
tionate in their racial composition. Where the 
school authority's proposed plan for conversion 
from a dual to a unitary system contemplates the 
continued existence of some schools that are all 
or predominantly of one race, they have the burden 
of showing that such school assignments are genuinely 
nondiscriminatory. 
The Columbus Board of Education's continuing "affirmative 
duty to disestablish the dual school system" is beyond question, 
Justice White stated.63 gut he insisted that the Board, 
61-Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 
402 U.S. 18 (1971). 
62Ibid., p. 26 
63columbus Board of Education v Penick, 443 U.S. 461 
(1979). 
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"never actively set out to dismantle this dual system."64 
The majority opinion in this Columbus case elucidated its 
support of the District Court ruling with the statement 
that since the Brown I decision, the Columbus defendants 
as their predecessors, were put on notice that action was 
required to correct and to prevent the increase of segregation, 
but that the Board failed to alleviate racial segregation 
in the schools.^5 
In support of the lower courts' rulings, Justice White 
set down these trenchant annotations: 
Against this background, we cannot fault the conclusion 
of the District Court and the Court of Appeal 
that at the time of trial there was system-wide 
segregation in the Columbus schools that was the 
result qf recent and remote intentionally segregative 
actions of the Columbus Board. While appearing 
not to challenge most of the subsidiary findings 
of histroical fact, Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, petitioners 
dispute many of the factual inferences drawn from 
these facts by the two courts below. On this 
record, however, there is no apparent reason to 
disturb the factual findings and conclusions entered 
by the District Court and strongly affirmed by 
the Court of Appeal after its own examination 
of the record. 
. . . In Dayton I, only a few apparently isolated 
discriminatory practices had been found; yet a 
system-wide remedy had been imposed without proof 
of a system-wide impact. Here, however, the District 
Court repeatedly emphasized that it had found 
purposefully segregative practices with current, 
system-wide impact 429 F. Supp., at 252, 259-260, 
264, 266.66 
64Ibid. 
65ibid. 
66Ibid. 
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In conclusion, Justice White declared that there had 
not been a misuse of the Keyes case, where it was held: 
That purposeful discrimination in a substantial 
part of a school system furnishes a sufficient 
basis for an inferential finding of a system-wide 
discriminatory intent unless otherwise rebutted 
and that given the purpose to operate a dual school 
system one could infer a connection between such 
purpose and racial separation in other parts of 
the school system. 6*7 
The decision of the Supreme Court's majority in this 
case chipped away at the distinction between de jure and 
de facto segregation in that it upheld court-ordered busing 
in a system where segregation was not state imposed or state 
sanctioned. 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart concurred 
with the results of the majority opinion, but the Chief 
Justice felt that it was wrong to hold the Board to an 
affirmative duty to desegregate because the school system 
was segregated in 1954. "Nothing in reason or our previous 
decisions provides foundation for this novel legal standard", 
the Chief Justice wrote in his opinion.®8 Justice Stewart 
offered in his opinion that the Court of Appeal had properly 
accepted the trial court's findings and that the District 
Court's system-wide remedy was proper. 
Justice Powell's dissenting opinion characterized the 
Court's majority opinion with these conclusions: 
67Ibid., p. 450. 
68Ibid., p. 469. 
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1. The federal judiciary should be limiting rather 
than expanding the extent to which courts 
are operating the public school systems of 
our country. 
2. The Court's opinions condone the creation 
of bad constitutional law and will even be 
worse for public education—an element of 
American life that is essential, especially 
for minority children.69 
In presenting a dissenting opinion laced with a challen­
ging intellectual position, Justice Rehnquist wrote: 
Concepts such as "discriminatory purpose' and 
system-wide violation' present highly mixed questions 
of law and fact. If district court discretion 
is not channelized by a clearly articulated meth­
odology, the entire federal court system will 
experience the disaffection which accompanies 
violation of Cicero's maxim not to 'lay down one 
rule in Athens and another rule in Rome'.70 
The majority general ruling in this Columbus case 
was that since the Board did not eliminate segrega­
tion in the schools, federal judges were justified 
in ordering large-scale busing for rebalancing 
the racial mix of students in the Columbus schools. 
The Dayton case began in 1972 when several students, 
through their parents, brought this case into the District 
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, charging that the 
Dayton Board of Education and various officials as well 
as the State Board of Education were operating a segregated 
school system in violation of the Equal Protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.in this Dayton I case, the 
G^Moore, P- 537. 
^Columbus v Penick, pp. 491-492. 
7lDayton Board of Education v Brickman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979). 
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District Court found: 
1. The existence of racially imbalanced schools, 
2. The use of optimal attendance zones, 
3. A recent Dayton Board of Education rescission of 
resolutions passed by the previous Board, which 
resolutions had acknowledged a role played by the 
Board in creation of segregative racial patterns 
and had called for various types of remedial measures, 
there was cumulatively a violation of the equal 
protection clause in the operation of the Dayton 
schools.72 
After rejecting two plans which had been approved by 
the District Court, the United States Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals approved a District Court plan involving district-
wide racial distribvution of each school which was to be 
•brought within 15 percent of the black-white ratio of Dayton.73 
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated 
and remanded, because the Court held that the constitutional 
violations found by the District Court did not justify the 
broad district-wide remedy imposed and that the case must 
be remanded to the District Court for the making of more 
specific finding.74 This decision seemed to increase the 
burden of demonstrating nonsegregative intent by school 
72Dayton Board of Education v Brickman, 433 U.S. 406 
(1977) 
73ibid. 
74Ibid. 
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officials and to limit the extent of r e m e d i e s .75 The Court 
ordered the city's desegregation plan left in place and 
remanded the case to the District Court for more specific 
findings.76 
In Dayton II, after protracted litigation at both the 
trial levels, the District Court dismissed the complaint.77 
The District Court's view was that: 
Although the Dayton Schools concededly were highly 
segregated, the Dayton Board's failure to alleviate 
this condition was not actionable absent sufficient 
evidence that the racial separation has been caused 
by the Board's own purposeful discriminatory condut. 
. . . Plaintiffs had failed to show either discrimina­
tory purpose or segregative effect, or both, with 
respect to the Board's challenged practices and 
policies, which included faculty hiring and assign­
ments, the use of optional attendance zones and 
transfer policies, and rescission of certain prior 
resolutions recognizing the Board's responsibility 
to eradicate racial separation in the public 
schools.78 
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's 
decision, stating that at the time of Brown I in 1954, 
the Dayton Board had operated a racially segregated dual 
school system. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that 
the Board was constitutionally required to disestablish 
75James B. Stedman, Busing for Segregation, Issue Brief 
Number IB 81010, (Washington, D.C. : The Library of Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, 1982), p. 78. 
76Moore, p. 535. 
77Dayton Board of Education v Brinkman 443 U.S. 526 (1979) 
7 8 i b i d .  
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that system and its effects, but that it had failed to 
discharge this duty. Finally, the Court of Appeals held 
that the consequences of the dual system together with the 
intentionally segregative impact of various practices since 
195 4 were system-wide and needed a system-wide remedy.79 
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed 
the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling. 
The Supreme Court on July 2, 1979 upheld desegregation orders 
for both the Columbus and the Dayton school systems in Ohio.80 
These decisions were the only two on school desegregation 
during a term that marked the 25th anniversary of the court's 
landmark ruling in Brown 1.81 
Justice White delivered the opinion in this Dayton 
II case, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, 
and Stevens joined.82 justice Stewart filed a dissenting 
opinion in which Chief Justice Burger joined, while Justice 
Powell filed a separate dissenting opinion. Justice Rehnquist 
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Powell joined. 
Justice White wrote that in the year the complaint 
was filed, 43% of the students in the Dayton system were 
79ifc>id. 
80fioore, p. 535 
82oayton Board of Education v Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 
(.1979). 
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black, but 51 of the 69 schools in the system were virtually 
all white or all b l a c k .83 
Justice White insisted that the District Court ordered 
the Board to take the necessary steps to assure that each 
school would roughly reflect the system-wide ratio of black 
and white students and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
then affirmed the decision. "We reversed the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals and ordered the case remanded to the 
District Court for further proceeding, Dayton I, Supra, 
Justice White d e c l a r e d .84 
The following excerpts summarize Justice White's delivery 
of the 5-4 majority opinion in Dayton II on July 2, 1979: 
. . . As was clearly established in Keyes and 
Swann, the Board had to do more than abandon its 
prior discriminatory purpose . . . The Board has 
had an affirmative responsibility to see that 
pupil assignment policies and school construction 
and abandonment practices 'are not used and do 
not serve to perpetuate or restablish the dual 
school system' . . . and the Board has a 'heavy 
burden* of showing that actions that increased 
or continued the effects of the dual system serve 
important and legitimate ends. Green v County 
School Board - 1968. 
The Board has never seriously contended that it 
fulfilled its affirmative duty or the heavy burden 
of explaining its failure to do so. Though the 
Board was often put on notice of the effects of 
its acts or omission, the District Court found 
that 'with one (counter-productive) exception 
83ibid., p. 529. 
84Ibid., p. 531. 
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to attempt was made to alter the racial characteris­
tics of any of the schools'. 
. . . The Court of Appeals held that far from 
performing its constitutional duty, the Board 
had engaged in 'post-1954 actions which have ex-
acerbuted the racial separation existing at the 
time of Brown I' . . . The Court of Appeals found 
that intentional faculty segregation effectively 
continued into the 1970's . . . Likewise, the 
Board failed in its duty and perpetuated racial 
separation in the schools by its pattern of school 
construction and site selection, recited by the 
District Court . . .We see no reason to disturb 
the factual determination which conclusively show 
the breach of duty found by the Court of Appeals.85 
Finally, Justice White concluded, "Because the Court 
of Appeals committed no prejudicial errors of fact or law, 
the judgment appealed from must be affirmed": 
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, stated 
that the difference in the District Court opinions in Columbus 
and Dayton was form two different conceptions of the law 
and methodology that govern school desegregation litigation.86 
Justice Rehnquist emphasized the following: 
The District Judge in Dayton did not employ a 
post-1954 'affirmative duty' test. Violations 
he did identify were found not to have any causal 
relationship to existing conditions of segregation 
in the Dayton School System. He did not employ 
a foreseeability test for residential segregation, 
or impugn the neighborhood school policy as an 
explanation for some existing one-race schools. 
In short, the Dayton and Columbus district judges 
different ideas what the law re-
S^Moore, pp. 550-551. 
86ibid., p. 552. 
87jbid. 
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Justice Rehnquist stated the Court of Appeals' heavy-
handed approach in this case was explained by the perceived 
inequity of imposing a system-wide racial balance in Dayton. 
Finally, Justice Rehnquist contended that meeting out equal 
remedies was not "equal justice under law".88 
The result of the two Ohio cases strengthened the 
doctrine established in the Keyes desision that federal 
courts were allowed to order a remedy where public school 
segregation was found to be the result of actions by school 
boards or other school-governing Unit.89 
Anti-Busing Initiative Struck Down 
The United States Supreme Court struck down the Wash­
ington state anti-busing initiative in the Seattle case. 
A state's authority to structure and regulate its own subordinate 
bodies was disapproved in the case. To desegregate its 
schools, Seattle School District No. 1 enacted a "Seattle 
Plan" in 1978 which required extensive use of mandatory 
busing.50 Subsequently, a statewide initiative (number 
350) was drafted by opponents of the Seattle Plan to terminate 
the use of mandatory busing for purposes of racial integration 
in Washington's public schools. This initiative prevented 
88ibid. 
89lbid., p. 535. 
90Washington v Seattle School District No. 1, No. 81-9 
(1982) P.L. 
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school boards from requiring students to attend schools 
other than those nearest or next nearest their homes. Actually, 
the initiative allowed school boards to assign students 
to other schools for special education programs, overcrowd-
edness, unsafe conditions or problems with physical facilities 
in the two nearest schools, or for practically any noninte-
grative purposes. The initiative passed in the 1978 November 
general election; in response, the Seattle School District, 
together with two other school districts,, brought suit against 
the state of Washington in the Federal District Court. 
The suit challenged the constitutionally of Initiative 350 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The District Court ruled that the initiative was unconstitu­
tional on the ground, inter alia; 
. . . That it established an impermissible racial 
classification in violation of Hunter v Erickson, 
393 U.S. 385 and Lee v Nyquist 318 F Supp. 710 
(WDNY), summarity aff'd, 402 U.S. 935. 'Because 
it permits busing for non-racial reason but forbids 
it for racial reasons'.91 
The District Court permanently enjoined implmentation 
of the initiative's restrictions and the United States Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's de­
cision. 
On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court 
affirmed the Court of Appeals judgment in a 5-4 decision. 
91Ibid. 
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Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court, in 
which Justice Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens joined. 
Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices 
Rehnquist, 0*Conner, and Chief Justice Burger joined. 
Justice Blackmun began the majority opinion by stating 
that the Court was presented with the extraordinary question 
of whether an elected local school board may use the Fourteenth 
Amendment to defend its program of busing for integration 
attacked by the State. 
The Seattle School District No. 1, is nearly coterminous 
with the borders of the city of Seattle, Washington, with 
112 schools and 54,000 students. Nearly 37% of the students 
are of Negro, Asian, American Indian, or Hispanic ancestry 
who live in segregated housing patterns, but the District 
had allowed student transfers since 1963 to help alleviate 
the isolation of minority students.92 
However, the school district came under pressure in 
1977 to accelerate its program of desegregation, and in 
response, the School Board enacted a resolution defining 
racial imbalance as: 
When combined minority student enrollment in a 
school exceeds the district-wide combined average 
by 20 percentage points . . . provided that the 
single minority enrollment of no school will exceed 
50 percent of the student body.93 
92Ibid., p. 2. 
93Ibid. 
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In September of 1977, the school district implemented 
a magnet program to alleviate racial isolation and 
encourage voluntary student transfer. Another problem sur­
faced when a disaproportionate number of Negro students 
transferred and caused an even greater increase in the school's 
racial imbalances. The school district decided that mandatory 
reassignment of students was necessary if racial isolation 
in the school was to be eliminated. In March of 1978, the 
School Board enacted the so-called "Seattle Plan" for de­
segregation: 
The plan, which was to make extensive use of. busing 
and mandatory reassignments, desegregate elementary 
schools by 'pairing' and 'triading' predominantly 
minority with predominantly white attendance areas, 
and by busing student assignments-on attendance 
zones rather than on race.^4 
The plan was implemented in the 1978-1979 school year 
and was effective because it substantially reduced the number 
of racially imbalanced schools in the district; but in 1977, 
shortly before the plan was adopted by the school district, 
a number of Seattle residents who opposed the desegregation 
strategies being discussed formed an organization called 
Citizens for Voluntary Integration Committee (CiVIC). After 
failing in state court, CiVIC drafted the statewide initiative 
which was directed solely at desegregative busing in general 
and the Seattle Plan in particular.95 
94jbid., p. 3. 
95ibid., p. 4. 
126 
After the initiative's statewide passage (66%), Seattle, 
Tacoma, and Pasco school districts initiated a suit against 
the State in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Washington to challenge the constitution of 
Initiative 350. The District Court held that Initiative 
350 was unconstitutional for these three independent reasons: 
1. The initiative established an impermissible 
racial classification, in violation of Hunter 
v Erickson 393 U.S. 385 (1969) and Lee v Nyquist 
318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 1970) (three-judge court), 
because it permits busing for non-racial reasons 
but forbids it for racial reasons. 
2. A racially discriminatory purpose was one of 
the factors which motivated the conception 
and adoption of the initiative. 
3. In the absence of a court order, Initiative 
350 barred even school boards that had engaged 
in de jure segregation from taking steps to 
foster integration. 96 
A divided panel of the United States Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed the District Court's ruling by relying 
entirely on the District Court's first rationale. 
The State then appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court where the Court's majority affirmed the Court of Appeals 
decision with the following Initiative 350 was in violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause : 
a) When a State allocates governmental power non-
neutrally, by explicity using the racial nature 
of a decision to determine the decision making 
96Ibid., p. 6. 
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process, its action 'places special burden 
on racial minorities within the governmental 
process', Hunter v Erickson, 393 U.S. at 391, 
thereby 'making it more difficult for certain 
racial minorities (than for other members of 
the community) to achieve legislation that 
is in their interest'. Id., at 395. Such 
a structuring of the political process is 'no 
more permissible than is denying members of 
a racial minority the vote, on an equal basis 
with others'. Id., at 391. 
b) Initiative 350 must fall because it does 'not 
attempt to allocate governmental power on the 
basis of any general principle', Hunter v Erickson, 
393 U.S. at 395, but instead uses the racial 
nature of an issue to define the governmental 
decision making structure, thus imposing substantial 
and unique burdens on racial minorities. The 
initiative worked a major recordering of the 
State's educational decision making process 
. . . After passage of Initiative 350, authority 
over all but one of a district's educational 
needs remained in the local board's hands. 
By placing power over desegregative busing 
at the state level, the initiative thus 'dif­
ferentiates between the treatment of problems 
involving racial matters and that afforded 
other problems in the same area'. Lee v Nyguist, 
318 F. Supp., at 718. Hunter's principle that 
meaningful and unjustified distinctions based 
on race are impermissible is still vital.97 
The Court's majority had reasoned that Initiative 
removed the authority to address a racial problem, but 
other problems, from the existing decision making body 
those seeking to eliminate de facto school segregation 
have to seek relief from the state legisalture or from 
350 
not 
and 
would 
the 
9?Washington v Seattle (Slip Opinion). 
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statewide electrorate. 
Justice Powell dissented and stated that the adoption 
of a neighborhood school policy by local school districts 
was not unconstitutional, but that the Courts held that such 
a policy at the state level was in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. The Justice referred to the majority's 
opinion as unprecedented intrusion into the structure of 
a state government. The significant issue of the dissension 
in Justice Powell's argument was the following: 
The Fourteenth Amendment leaves the State free 
to distribute the powers of government as they 
will between their legislative judicial branches. 
Hughes v Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 467 (1950).99 
Justice Powell wrote that in his view, "that amendment 
leaves the States equally free to decide matters of concern 
to the state at the state rather than local level of govern­
ment. He wrote that Hunter was irrelevant and it was the 
Court through its majority decision in this case that disrupts 
the normal course of state government. Justice Powell insisted 
a neighborhood school policy does not offend the Fourteenth 
Amendment because the Court never held that there was an 
affirmative duty to integrate the schools where there was 
no unconstitutional segregation. Powell cited Swann v Char­
lotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971): 
98ibid., p. 16. 
99lbid., p. 2. 
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Dayton Board of Education v Brinkman, 443 U.S. 406, 417 (1977) 
to support the latter conclusion.100 
The Court in applying Hunter had used a case that involved 
Akron, Ohio City Council's enactment of a fair housing ordinance. 
The local citizenry amended the city charted to read that 
ordinances regulatin real estate transactions on the basis 
of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry must 
first be approved by a majority of the electors. The Supreme 
Court ruled that this amendment was unconstitutional.101 
The Lee v Nyquist case involved an effort to eliminate 
de facto segregation in the New York education system. The 
New York Legislature enacted a statute barring education 
officials and school boards from assigning students to any 
school on the account of race. A three-judge federal District 
Court held the stature unconstitutional.102 
In this landmark case, the Supreme Court did not equate 
Initiative 350 as just a mere repeal of the "Seattle Plan", 
but held that the state legislature and voting populace were 
able to selectively enact laws to hinder the paths of minorities. 
lOOibid., p. 5. 
lOlHunter v Erickson, 393 U.S. 385; 89 S. Ct. 557; 21 
L. Ed. 2d 616 (1969) . 
102Lee v Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 1970). 
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In this landmark case, the Supreme Court did not equate 
Initiative 350 as just a mere repeal of the "Seattle Plan", 
but held that the state legislature and voting populace were 
able to selectively enact laws to hinder the paths of minorities. 
Anti-Busing Initiative Approved 
The Crawford and the Seattle cases which contained similar 
legal issues were before the Supreme Court at the same time, 
and were decided upon the same day. The significance of 
the Crawford case was that Proposition i!03 Qf the California 
Constitution was held not to be in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.104 The first 
principle of Hunters-OS statutory racial classification was 
not in evidence because Proposition I neither stated or implied 
that neighborhood schooling should be made available to one 
because of his race.106 
Justice Powell delivered the Court's majority opinion 
in which Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Blackmun filed 
a concurring opinion, in which Justice Brannan .joined. Justice 
Marshall filed a dissenting opinion. 
103caij.fornj.a/ Constitution, art. 18, sec I. 
104Crawford v Board of Education of the City of Los 
Angeles, No.81-38 Slip Opinion (1982). 
105HUnter v Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, (1969). 
10®Crawford v Board of Education, p. 4. 
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Justice Powell saw the question for the Court to decide 
as being whether Proposition I in itself was in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Proposition I as it is found in Article 1, Section 7 
(a) of the Calfiornia Constitution reads: 
No court of this state may impose upon the State 
of California or any public entity, board, or 
official any obligation or responsibility with 
respect to the use of pupil school assignment or 
pupil transportation, 1) except to remedy a specific 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
and 2) unless a federal court would be permitted 
under federal decisional law to impose that obligation 
or responsibility upon such party to remedy the 
specific violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
While the United States Supreme Court answered the legality 
of Proposition I, litigation in this case began in 1963 when 
minority students in this Los Angeles Unified School District 
filed a class action in the state court to seek the desegre­
gation of the District's schools.108 In 1970, the trial 
court held that Los Angeles Unified School District was sub­
stantially in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions 
and ordered the District to prepare a desegregation plan 
for immediate implementation. 
When the school district appealed to the California 
Supreme Court, the lower court decision was affirmed but 
on different basis. The trial court found de jure segregation 
lO^California, ConS111u.tion, art. I, sec 7 (a). 
108crawford v Board of Education, p. 1. 
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in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, while the California Supreme Court based its 
affirmance on the Equal Protection Clause of the State Con­
stitution. 
The California Supreme Court's opinion explained that 
under the California Constitution: 
State school boards . . . bear a constitutional 
obligation to take reasonable steps to alleviate 
segregation in the public schools, whether the 
segregation be de facto or de jure in origin.HO 
The California Supreme Court then remanded the case 
to the trial court for preparation of a reasonably feasible 
plan for school desegregation.HI On remand, the trial court 
rejected the District's mostly voluntary desegregation plan 
but approved a second plan which required mandatory school 
reassignment and busing. The plan was implemented in the 
Fall of 1978, but because of dissatisfaction of all parties 
to the litigation the trial court considered alternatives 
to the plan in October of 1979. In November of 1979, the 
voters of California ratified Proposition I, an Amendment 
to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the State 
Constitution. 
lO^Crawford v Board of Education, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 
p. 2d 28 (1976). 
H-Olbid. , p. 34. 
Hlcrawford v Board of Education of Los Angeles, U.S., 
No. 81-38 (1982), p. 2. 
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After the approval of Proposition I, the District sought 
to hold all mandatory reassignment and busing through the 
Superior Court/ but on May 19, 1980, the Superior Court denied 
the District application and ordered the implementation of 
a revised desegregation plan. The California Court of Appeals 
reversed the Superior Court decision and the California Supreme 
Court denied a hearing of the case. The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari. 
Justice Powell stated that the United States Supreme 
Court agreed with the California Court of Appeals in rejection 
of the contention that "once a State "chooses to do 'more' 
than the Fourteenth Amendment requires, it may never recede." 
The purposes of the Proposition are stated in its text and 
are legitimate, nondiscriminatory objectives, stated Justice 
Powell. 
The United States Supreme Court held: 
Proposition I does not inhibit enforcement of any 
federal law or constitutional requirement; moreover, 
Proposition I does not violate the Fourteenth Amend­
ment . 
a) Proposition I does not embody, expressly or 
implicitly, a racial classification. 
b) Proposition I cannot be characterized as something 
more than a mere repeal. Hunter v. Erickson, 
393 U.S. 385, distinguished. 
c) Even if it could be assumed that Proposition 
I had a disproportionate adverse effect on 
racial minorities, there is no reason to differ 
with the state appellate court's conclusion 
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that Proposition I in fact was not enacted 
with a discriminatory purpose.H2 
Justice Marshall, the lone dissenter in this case, ex­
plained that he failed to see much difference between the 
Seattle and Washington cases. Moreover, Justice Marshall 
stated that, "As in Seattle, Hunter, and Reitman, Proposition 
I's repeal of the court's enforcement powers was the work 
of an independent governmental entity, and not of the state 
courts themselves."113 Finally, Justice Marshall claimed 
that this repeal drastically altered the substantive rights 
granted by existing policy is patently obvious from the facts 
of this litigation. 
As a final point in this chapter it should be noted 
that in Reitman v. Mulkey, the California Supreme Court 
Considered the constitutionality of another California Pro­
position and ruled that it was unconstitutional because it 
(the proposition) gave the State's approval to private racial 
discrimination. The United States Supreme Court affirmed 
the decision of the California Supreme Court.H5 
H^ibid., p. 7 
H^Crawford v. Board of Education U.S., (Slip opinion) 
(1982), p. 12. 
H^Ibid. 
H S l b i d .  
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CHAPTER IV 
REVIEW OF COURT DECISIONS 
Introduction 
Although only a few landmark Court dicisions have been 
rendered that involve specific issues of de facto segregation 
and busing, the cases selected for review in this chapter 
are those delineating such issues as segregative intent, 
acceptance of district-wide busing plans, and acceptance 
of interdistrict remedy. 
From the examination of the major decisions on de facto 
segregation, it can be observed that intent to segregate 
by school authorities and racial classification in school 
statutes were crucial aspects of the cases. While de facto 
segregation has been under challenge in the courts, the specific 
issues in each of these cases proceeded through strict judicial 
scrutiny. 
Interestingly, where segregative intent was found, the 
concept of de jure segregation was broadened. Consequently, 
the remedy included extensive busing for the eradication 
of segregation. 
Organization of Cases Selected for Review 
Each case reviewed in this chapter was identified and 
selected because it complied with one or more of the following 
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criteria;1 
(1) The case is considered to have been a landmark case 
in the broad constitutional areas of racial 
discrimination and due process of law. 
(2) The case helped to establish precedent or "case 
law" in a particular area such as segregative 
intent, anti-busing initiatives, or interdistrict 
remedy. 
(3) The issues in the case relate to one of the 
following subtopics: 
a. segregative intent; 
b. rejection of multi-district remedy and 
acceptance of interdistrict remedy; 
c. denial of annual readadjustment of school 
zones to prevent "minority-majority" 
schools; 
d. acceptance of district-wide busing plans; 
e. acceptance and denial of anti-busing 
initiatives. 
(4) The case is considered to have been important in 
the area of de facto segregation and was 
decided upon by the United States Supreme Court. 
1Joseph E. Bryson and Charles P. Bentley, Ability Grouping 
of Public School Students (Charlottesville, Virqinia: The 
Michie Company, 1980), p. 92. 
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The first landmark case is the United States Supreme 
Court decision relating to the constitutional issue of segre­
gative intent in a public school district. This following 
case is significant because it provides the legal precedents 
for any later litigation relating to the issues of segregative 
intent in school districts: 
Keyes v. School District. No.. 1, Denver, Colorado (1973) 
The secondary category of cases reviewed in this chapter 
consists of those United States Supreme Court cases that 
have significantly contributed to the establishment of legal 
precedents in the rejection of a multi-district remedy and 
the acceptance of an interdistrict remedy: 
(1) Milliken v. Bradley (1974); 
(2) Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond 
(1973); 
(3) Buchanan v. Evans (1975). 
In the third category is the United States Supreme Court 
landmark decision relating to the annual readjustment of 
attendance zones to prevent minority-majority schools: 
Pasadena City Board of Education y. Spanqler (1976) 
In the fourth category are those cases relating to the 
acceptance of district-wide busing plans: 
(1) Columbus Board of Education y. Penick (1979) 
(2) Dayton Board of Eduycation v. Brinkman (1979) 
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The final category selected for review consists of two 
cases involving anti-busing initiatives: 
(1) Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 (1982) 
(2) Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Education (1982) 
United States Supreme Court Landmark Decision— 
Segregative Intent 
Keyes v. School District No. lf Denver, Colorado 
413 U.S. 189 (1973) 
Overview 
Inasmuch as this was a distinct landmark decision involving 
the issue of deliberate segregation, it serves as the legal 
reference for almost all subsequent judicial decision relating 
to de facito segregation. Subsequent judicial decisions relative 
to de facto segregation have been based upon the legal tenets 
of this case. 
Facts 
The United States Supreme Court received the Keyes case 
on appeal from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The case 
involved segregation in the Park Hill area schools in the 
Denver school district. The plaintiffs sought the desegre­
gation of all schools in the Denver school district, partic­
ularly those in the core city area. The significant question 
in this case was whether the entire district should be declared 
segregated because of the segregation problem in one portion 
of the district. 
Decision 
The Court affirmed that a policy of intentional segre­
gation had been proved with respect to a significant portion 
of the school system, in a 7-1 decision. The Court held 
that the burden of proof lies with the school authority to 
show that their actions with the other segregated schools 
in the system were not likewise motivated by a segregated 
intent. Justice Brannan wrote the majority opinion. 
Legal Precedents Established 
The following legal principles established by this land 
mark decision are applicable to cases relating to classifica 
tion of minority students and segregative intent: 
(1) Negroes and Hispanos are to be placed in the same 
disadvantaged category since both groups suffer 
the same educational inequities when compared with 
the treatment afforded Anglo students. 
(2) The proof that school authorities have pursued 
intentional segregative policy in a substantial 
portion of the school district will support a 
finding by the trial court of the existence of a 
dual system. 
(3) The long-held distinction between de jure and de 
facto segregation was practically eliminated. 
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Cases Contributing Significantly to Rejection of a 
Multi-District Remedy and Acceptance 
an .Inter-District Remedy 
Milliken v. Bradley 418 U.S. 717 (1974) 
Overview 
The well publicized United States Supreme Court decision 
in Milliken v. Bradley became the legal foundation for the 
rejection of a multi-district remedy for a single district's 
segregation problem. The now famous case also provides the 
Court's viewpoint concerning the merger of school districts 
for the purpose of racial balance in school districts when 
only one of the school districts involved is responsible 
for the segregation problem. 
Facts 
The mother of Ronald and Richard Bradley initiated a 
class action in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan against certain state officials 
and the Board of Education of the City of Detroit, seeking 
the desegregation of the Detroit Public Schools. The District 
Court ultimately concluded that the defendants had engaged 
in unconstitutional activities for which the state was responsible 
and which had resulted in de jure segregation in the Detroit 
school district. 
The United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the District Court's findings of de jure segregation in the 
Detroit school district and the propriety and the necessity 
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of a metropolitan desegregation plan since the state was 
responsible. The Court of Appeals then remanded the case 
to have all suburban districts that might be affected by 
any metropolitan remedy included as parties to the case. 
The case was then appealed to the United State Supreme Court. 
Decision 
The United States Supreme Court reversed (5-4) and remanded 
the case for the formulation of a decree restricted to the 
city of Detroit. In writing the majority opinion for the 
Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger insisted: 
We conclude that the relief ordered by the District 
Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals was 
based upon erroneous standards and was unsupported 
by record evidence that acts of the outlying districts 
affected the discrimination found to exist in the 
schools of Detroit. 
. . . The case is remanded for further proceeding 
consistent with the opinion leading to prompt for­
mulation of a decree directed to eliminate the 
segregation found to exist in Detroit city schools, 
a remedy which has been delayed since 1970. 
Legal Precedent Established 
The major precedent established in this decision involved 
the Court's decision which states: 
Federal courts can not impose multi-district, area-
wide remedies to a single district segregation 
problem unless discriminatory acts of other dis­
tricts had caused inter-district segregation. 
Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 
412 U.S. 92 (1973) 
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Facts 
The Richmond school desegregation case began in 1970 
and involved the counties of Henrico and Chesterfield. Judge 
Braxton Craven of the United States Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals insisted that District Court Judge Robert Merhige, 
Jr. did not have the authority to consolidate the three school 
systems, and that when the state-imposed segregation had 
been removed, intervention by the District Court was not 
justifiable. 
Decision 
The United State Supreme Court affirmed the Court of 
Appeals decision to strike down interdistrict busing in a 
4-to-4 deadlock vote. 
Discussion 
Because of Justice Powell's refusal to participate in 
the voting, the deadlock vote did not provide any legal guide­
lines for lower courts to follow. A later 5-to-4 decision 
to disallow multi-district busing (Milliken) provided the 
legal foundation for future district consolidated cases. 
Buchanan v. Evans 
423 U.S. 963 1975 
Facts 
When action was brought seeking the desegregation of 
the Wilmington, Delaware public schools, Judge Caleb Wright 
of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware 
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imposed an interdistrict remedy involving the reorganization 
or consolidation of the New Castle County school districts. 
A motion for a stay of implementatin of the order was made 
to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The motion was denied. 
Decision 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed (6-3) the District 
Court's decision calling for the implementation of an inter-
district busing plan. It was established that the state of 
Delaware and the city of Wilmington were party to segregative 
policies because Wilmington had been excluded in a statewide 
school district consolidation effort. The court ruled that 
act of omission constituted de jure segregation. 
Discussion 
This decision specifically illustrated that in cases 
involving state actions leading to school segregation, the 
concept of de jure segregation becomes apparent. The courts 
made a distinction in their decisions between this case and 
the Milliken decision. Furthermore, a comparison of this 
case to the Swann de jure segrgation case was noted by the 
courts. 
A Case Contributing Significantly to the Problem of Evolving 
Demographic Trends 
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler 
427 U.S. 424 (1976) 
Facts 
Several Pasadena, California high school students and 
their parents brought a purported class action against school 
officials seeking injuctive relief from allegedly unconsti­
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tutional segregation in the Pasadena public schools. The 
District Court held that the defendants' educational policies 
and procedures violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The District 
Court then ordered the school district officials to submit 
a desegregation plan for the 1970-1971 school year, ordered 
that no school have a majority of any minority students, 
and retained jurisdiction over the school district. On appeal 
to the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
District Court"s decisions were affirmed, although the Court 
of Appeals indicated disapproval of the lifetime commitment 
to a "no minority-majority" requirement. 
Decision 
The United States Supreme Court ruled (6-2) that the 
normal pattern of human migration had resulted in changes 
in Pasadena's residential patterns and that these shifts 
were not attributed to any segregative action on behalf of 
school officials. The Court then stated that the District 
Court's 1970 injunction should in all respects be dissolved, 
that the District Court's jurisdiction over the Pasadena 
Unified School District should be terminated, and that the 
suggested modifications of the Pasadena Plan should be accepted. 
Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion. 
Discussion 
While this was a decisive ruling on a District Court's 
jurisdiction, the decision was opposite of a critical ruling 
in Swann. In Swann, the Court ruled that "once a right and 
a violation have been shown the scope of a District Court's 
equitable powers to remedy past wrong is broad ..." How­
ever, the Court reaffirmed a portion of Swann by stating 
that authorities are not required to make year-by-year adjust­
ments of the racial composition of student bodies once the 
affirmative duty to desegregate had been accomplished and 
racial discrimination had been eliminated. 
Cases Related to the United States. Supreme Court's 
Acceptance of District-Wide Busing Columbus 
Board of Educatitin v. Penick 
443 U.S. 449 (1979) 
Facts 
In 1973, students in the Columbus, Ohio school system 
brought a class action charging that the Columbus Board of 
Education and its officials pursued a policy that perpetuated 
racial segregation in the public schools, contrary to the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court found that in the 
intervening years since 1954 there had been a series of Board 
actions and practices that could not be explained without 
reference to racial concerns. 
Decision 
The United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the lower court's findings. The United States Supreme Court 
upheld the Court of Appeals' decision in a 7-2 vote with 
Justice White writing the majority opinion. 
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Discussion 
Justice Byron White, in writing the majority opinion, 
stated that the District Court had found that in 1954 when 
Brown I was decided, the Columbus Board had operated a dual 
school system. Justice White further insisted: 
Proof of purposeful and effective maintenance of 
a body of separate black schools in a substantial 
part of the system itself is prima facie proof 
of a dual school system and supports a finding 
to this effect absent sufficient contrary proof 
by the Board, which was not forthcoming in this 
case. 
The District Court emphasized that it had found purposefully 
segregative practices with current system-wide impact. Thus, 
the United States Supreme Court ruled that judges were justified 
in ordering large-scale busing of students. 
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman 
443 U.S. 526 (1979) 
Facts 
In 1972, several students and their parents brought 
action in the District Court by alleging that the Dayton 
Board of Education and various local and state officials 
were operating a racially segregated school system. The 
plaintiffs further charged that the action of the officials 
was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. When the case 
was brought before the United States Supreme Court, the de­
cision was for a return of the case to the lower court because 
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of a lack of specific finding showing segregative intent 
on behalf of the school authorities. 
Decision 
When the case was returned to the United States Supreme 
Court following District Court and the United States Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals action, the Court ruled (5-4) in 
favor of the Court of Appeals decision for district-wide 
busing. Justice White wrote the opinion. 
Discussion 
An important factor to emerge from this decision was 
that the Court reversed the burden of proof requirement. 
The Court was now stating that the school authorities bore 
the responsiblity by considering the system's segregation 
status at the time of Brown I as relevant to the present 
case. Justice Potter Stewart, however, insisted that the 
party bearing the burden of proof was likely to determine 
who would prevail in the litigation. Justice Rehnquist re­
sponded by stating that the Columbus and Dayton District 
Court opinions point out the limitation of Justice Stewart's 
perception of the proper roles of the trial judge and reviewing 
courts. 
Cases Involving Anti-Busing. Initiatives 
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 
U.S. 
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Facts 
In 1978, the Seattle School District No. 1 enacted the 
so-called Seattle Plan for the Desegregation of its schools. 
The plan required the extensive use of mandatory busing. 
A statewide initiative was then drafted to terminate the 
utilization of buses for the purpose of racial integration 
in the public schools of Washington. After the passage of 
the initiative (Initiative 350) in the November, 1978 general 
election, the Seattle, Pasco and Tacoma school districts brought 
suit against the State in the Federal District Court. The 
suit challenged the constitutionality of Initiative 35.0 under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The District Court held the initiative unconstitutional on 
the grounds that it included an impermissible racial classifi­
cation. On appeal, the United States Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed the decision on the District Court. 
Decision 
The United States Supreme Court Affirmed (6-4) the lower 
courts decision. The Court stated that when a state allocates 
governmental power in a non-neutral"manner by using the 
racial nature of a decision to determine the decision-making 
process, it places special burdens on racial minorities within 
the governmental process. Justice Blackmum insisted that 
Initiative 350 must fall because it does not attempt to 
allocate governmental power on any general principle. 
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Crawford y. Board of Education ofthe City of Los 
Facts 
In 1970, a California state court found de jure segregation 
in the Los Angeles Unified School District which violated 
both State and Federal Constitutions. The state court then 
ordered the school district to prepare a desegregation plan. 
The California Supreme Court affirmed the decision, but based 
its decision on the Equal Protection Clause of the State 
Constitution which bars de facto as well as de jure segre­
gation. On remand, the California District Court approved 
of a desegregation plan that included substantial mandatory 
reassignment and busing. The voters of California subsequently 
ratified an amendment (Proposition I) to the State Constitution 
which provided that state courts shall not order mandatory 
pupil assignment or transportation, unless a federal court 
would be permitted under federal decisional law to do so 
to remedy a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. 
The California Second Appellate District Court of Appeals 
reversed the California District Court's decision by ruling 
that Proposition I was constitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and barred the requiring of mandatory student re­
assignment and busing. 
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Decision 
On Certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed 
(8-1) the California Court of Appeals' decision. The Court 
ruled that Proposition I does not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment and that Proposition I does not embody, expressly 
or implicity, a racial classification. 
Discussion 
The Court, on the same day, decided on the two state 
constitutional amendments, each designed to curtail or eliminate 
the use of mandatory student assignment or transportation 
as a remedy for de facto desegregation. The Court decided 
that the Seattle initiative was unconstitutional because 
it used the racial nature of an issue to define the governmental 
process and the Initiative 350 placed unique burdens on racial 
minorities. In Crawford, the Court decided that Proposition 
I was constitutional because having gone beyond the require­
ments of the Federal Constitution, the state was free to 
return in part to the standard prevailing generally throughout 
the United States. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND CONCLUDING STATEMENT. 
Summary 
De facto desegregation litigation gained prominence 
after many years of public school de jure desegregation liti­
gation by the courts. The Brown I decision in 1954 began 
an era to rid all states of segregation imposed by laws. 
The final thrust to eradicate all facets of de jure segregation, 
"with all deliberate speed", "root and branch", and "immedi­
ately", largely culminated in the Swann case in which extensive 
busing was instituted in order to balance the races in the 
schools. In Swann, the Supreme Court presented the following 
opinion as the Constitutional requirement for de jure segregated 
school districts to eliminate state-imposed segregation in 
the public schools: 
All things being equal, with no history of discrim­
ination it might well be desirable to assign pu­
pils to schools nearest their homes. But things 
are not equal in a system that has been deliberately 
constructed and maintained to enforce racial segre­
gation. 1 
The era of de facto desegregation, a more elusive and complex 
form of school segregation with the same unpleasant result— 
1-Swann v. Charlotte-Mechlenburg Board of Education 403 
U.S. 912 (1971). 
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school segregation, was ushered in during the mid-1960's 
with a scattering of court cases across the nation. ae facto 
segregation was often a non-Southern form of school segregation; 
indeed, the public had come to believe that school segregation 
was mainly a problem in the Southern states. A review of 
judicial records reveals that several de facto desegregation 
cases were appealed to the United States Supreme Court and 
then remanded back to the lower courts over a number of years 
prior to final decisions by the United States Supreme Court. 
Keyes became a landmark de facto desegregation case 
in that the Court defined de jure segregation as including 
segregation resulting from intentionally segregative school 
board policies, even if the district had never been segregated 
by statute. Strategic issues to surface in de facto segrega­
tion cases were the concepts of interdistrict and multi-district 
remedies, busing to balance the racial ratios in the schools, 
annual redrawing of school attendance zones, racial classifi­
cation of students written into public school statutes, intent 
versus extent, and the public's request for neighborhood 
schools. 
The issue of busing surfaced in de facto desegregation 
cases as a focal point in a manner which had been rarely 
presented before in de jure desegregation cases. Although 
the use of buses for school integration has discretionary 
limitations in the Court's view, these limitations have never 
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been precisely demarcated by the Court. Therefore, in the 
Court's failure to make clear the extent of permissible busing, 
many members of the United States Congress have attempted 
to bridge the gap between the vague and the finite of busing 
limitations as an appropriate method to solve what many of 
them consider a much larger social matter. 
As a guide to the legal research, five questions were 
designed and listed in the introductory chapter of this study. 
While the review of the literature concerning school desegre­
gation litigation provided further insights into the questions, 
the answers to the questions are found in Chapters III and 
IV. School administrators and board members will find the 
responses to these questions helpful in assessing the issue 
facto segregation. 
Research provided answers to the following questions: 
1. What has been the trend in regard to court-ordered busing 
in de facto segregated school districts? 
The selected United States Supreme Court cases in this 
study show that the Court might uphold busing in cases involving 
segregative intent and in cases of racial classification 
in state public-school statutes. De facto segregation liti- . 
gation has reached the United States Supreme Court from 
cities across the nation. The1" most critical factors in 
de facto segregation cases have been the issues of segregative 
intent and busing for racial balance in the public schools. 
2. How has the United States Supreme Court decided in cases 
involving de facto segregation? 
The analysis of the judicial decisions in this study 
revealed that the Supreme Court developed a conservative 
posture in many de facto segregation cases. The busing of 
school children as the most effective means to correct the 
segregation problem in the public schools has not been un-
amimously decided. 
3. What does the United States Supreme Court mean when the 
question of "intent to segregate" becomes the judicial issue 
in a de facto segregation case? 
The United States Supreme Court has mandated that where 
segregative intent on the part of local or state officials 
is found, then the concept of de jure segregation is extended. 
Thus, the remedy in highly segregated school districts has 
included the implementation of district-wide and interdistrict 
busing. 
4. What has the United States Supreme Court required in 
busing across school district boundaries in order to correct 
an inequity in segregated school systems? 
The Supreme Court has ruled that a federal court could 
not properly impose a multi-district, area-wide remedy on 
a single-district de jure segregation problem unless it was 
first established that unconstitutional, racially discrimi­
natory acts of other districts had caused interdistrict 
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segregation, or that district lines, not drawn for political 
convenience, had been deliberately drawn on the basis of 
race. 
5. To what extent has the United States Supreme Court mandated 
remedial plans to desegregate de facto school systems? 
The Court has ruled that the extent of any remedy should 
be proportional to the constitutional violations committed 
by the school officials. 
Conclusions 
The following conclusions are presented, based on the 
analysis of decisions rendered by the United States Supreme 
Court dealing with de facto desegregation and busing. The 
information serves as a foundation for understanding how 
future cases may be decided by lower courts, as well as by 
the United States Supreme Court. 
1. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the burden 
rests upon school officials to prove there are no segregative 
efforts on their behalf in the making of school policies 
or in their failure to act which would thereby hinder the 
elimination of school segregation. 
2. The Court has ruled that "purposeful discrimination in 
a substantial part of a school system furnishes a sufficient 
basis for an inferential finding of a system-wide discrimina­
tory intent unless otherwise rebutted". The establishment 
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of the described discrimination will permit federal judges 
to order system-wide busing. 
3. The Court has held that minority students such as Hispanos 
are to be placed in the same category as Black students if 
both groups suffer the same educational inequities compared 
with the treatment afforded Anglo students. 
4. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that federal 
courts can not properly impose a multi-district, area-wide 
remedy to a single district's de jure segregation problem 
unless it was first established that unconstitutional dis­
criminatory acts by the other districts had caused interdistrict 
segregation. 
5. The United States Supreme Court will uphold an interdistrict . 
remedy for proven de jure segregation when shown that there 
was a constitutional violation which affected the school 
disricts. 
6. The Court has held that if a dual system existed in a 
district in 1954, then the school district had a continuing 
duty to eradicate the effects of the dual system. 
7. The Court has held that a state is not immune to respon­
sibility for policies and official acts that lead to constitutional 
violations resulting in school segregation. 
8. The Court has held that proof of purposeful and effective 
maintenance of a body of separate black schools in a substan­
tial part of the system is prima facie proof of a dual system. 
157 
9. The Court has held that once a school system had initiated 
a plan that would achieve a unitary system and has been de­
clared a unitary school system by a federal court, then annual 
adjustments to the attendance zones are not required. 
10. The Court will not support the contention that once a 
state chooses to do more than the Fourteenth Amendment re­
quires, it may never recede. 
11. The Court will not allow a constitutional amendment to 
the state constitution concerning school attendance which 
would embody a racial classification. The Court ruled that 
by using the racial nature of a decision to determine the 
decision-making process, the action then places special burdens 
on racial minorities within the governmental process. 
Concluding Statement 
The study was not designed to reach any opinions as 
to the advantages or disadvantages of the United States Supreme 
Court decisions in these de facto desegregation cases. Rather, 
the thrust of this study was to provide analyses and clar­
ification of the selected United States Supreme Court decisions 
that shape some of the legal guidelines by which school 
officials must abide. Therefore, the interpretation of the 
legal decisions presented in this study will become valuable 
to school boards and school administrators in the study of 
de facto school desegregation and busing. 
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To that end, this study was designed (1) to review the 
specific and deciding factors of the selected United States 
Supreme Court cases concerning de facto school segregation; 
(2) to note the Congressional concerns of busing for racial 
purposes in the public schools; (3) to provide an overview 
of the nature and scope of the division of the justices of 
the United States Supreme Court in order.to discern how they 
might vote in future de facto school desegregation cases; 
and (4) to provide responses to the five specific questions 
converning busing and de facto desegregation. 
While the decisions which have been rendered by the 
United States Supreme Court provide only one decisive trend, 
it is apparent that the nine justices are not likely to reach 
a unanimous vote on any single de facto desegregation case. 
De facto segregation is permissible before the law and 
does not require any specific action on behalf of the govern­
ing bodies to change or correct the situation, if it can 
be proven that state or local officials were not responsible 
for the segregation. Thus, the concept of segregative intent 
has become the most decisive factor in any desegregation 
case. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Research studies that parallel this study should be 
undertaken in order to investigate 
a) the legal aspects of busing using other United States 
Supreme Court de facto school desegregation cases comprehen­
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sively; 
b) the sociological impact that the United States Supreme 
Court de facto school desegregation decisions have on students, 
educators, parents, and communities; 
c) the educational impact that the United States Supreme 
Court de facto school desegregation decisions have on the 
students. 
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